

ITEM #11
11/07/2023

From: Paul Mantey <paulm@provote1.com>
Sent: Sunday, November 5, 2023 10:25 PM
To: Clerk/BOS; District 1; District 2; District 3; District 4; District 5
Cc: Brad Stiers; Noal Phillips
Subject: BOS Meeting, Nov 7th, Agenda Item 11
Attachments: Letter to Fresno BOS.pdf

CAUTION!!! - EXTERNAL EMAIL - THINK BEFORE YOU CLICK

Please see the attached letter for this Tuesday's Board of Supervisors' Meeting.

Best regards

Paul Mantey
President



90 W. Poplar Ave | Porterville, CA 93257
tel (800) 232-9819 | fax (800) 233-1086

[website](#) | [email](#)



November 3rd, 2023

To: Board of Supervisors
Fresno County Hall of Records
2281 Tulare Street, Room 301
Fresno, CA 93721

Re: Meeting of November 7th, Agenda Item 11 under File #23-1272

Dear members of the Fresno County Board of Supervisors,

Please find this letter as an affirmation of our commitment to Fresno County and justification as to why ProVoteSolutions (ProVote) is the most qualified choice as your professional election printer.

We presume the Board has some history of vendor concerns, so for the sake of brevity, I will keep our points as concise as possible to support a quick decision.

- ProVote is well-established, highly respected, and financially sound. ProVote is also the largest election printer located in California. We have invested over \$5,000,000 in systems, services, and equipment during the last 18 months, solely to support our customers and enhance the quality and security of our election printing services. These investments not only added capacity and redundancy, but they also served to increase our quality inspections and auditing capabilities so we can provide our counties with assurance that their elections run smoothly.

These investments include but are not limited to:

- ◆ A fourth certified election press that can print more than 1,000,000 ballots per day. This addition not only balances our production needs but also significantly increases the quality of the printed ballots. We are confident in our ability to handle Fresno County's election printing needs, even within the current timeframe.
 - ◆ A quarter-million-dollar inline camera inspection system capable of capturing 4K still images of the ballots, front and back, and flagging any potential issues. This system scans the printed image and compares it to the intended image at high speed. It is so sensitive that it will flag an errant pixel incorrectly printed or even a small insect that lands on the ballot.
 - ◆ A second high-speed cut and fold line for increased capacity and redundancy.
 - ◆ A second inserting line was designed specifically for the demands of California VBM needs. This includes a full camera-matching system to ensure the delivered quality and audit trail of VBM ballots.
 - ◆ Images of all VBM packets are captured for future audit in case of questions.
-
- We are a highly secure facility, complete with RFID and fenced perimeters, zoned internal operations, surveillance, and a SOC2 data secure operation. We understand security and incorporate it into our business methodology before our customers must ask. It is part of the integrity embedded within our pricing.
 - Upon review of both contracts on the agenda, once the incumbent vendor requested an additional allowance of \$45,000 per year to increase the security of their operation, they were no longer the most cost-competitive option for Fresno taxpayers. The final printing cost for an election involves a myriad of variables. But we calculated multiple scenarios of the most significant costs and found that ProVote was the most competitive. Please see the second-page price comparison, based upon a single 18" ballot.
 - Our Past President and I are both Fresno County residents. While ProVote provides election printing services for nearly half of the counties in California, our company leadership has a personal interest in the error-free success of Fresno County elections.

In summary, when considering cost, quality, and security, ProVoteSolutions is clearly the best option for Fresno County and its taxpayers

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'Paul Mantey'.

Paul Mantey, President

ProVoteSolutions

Description	Nov. 2022 Election Data	March 2024 Projection	ProVote	IVS
VBM Ballots Mailed	514,390	529,800	\$262,251.00	\$264,900.00
Vote Center Ballot on Demand paper stock	63,200	65,100	\$7,812.00	\$9,765.00
Vote Center ICX paper stock	35,600	36,700	\$4,404.00	\$5,505.00
Test paper stock (Ballot on Demand)	4,800	4,900	\$1,470.00	\$1,274.00
Test paper stock (ICX)	3,200	3,300	\$988.80	\$858.00
Test ballots		0		
Voter Instructions (8.5 x 11" single sheet)		535,000	\$24,610.00	\$32,100.00
Return Envelopes - Mass mailing & supplemental mailings		535,000	\$35,310.00	\$44,405.00
Outgoing Envelopes - Mass mailing & supplemental mailings		535,000	\$32,635.00	\$37,450.00
CVR Envelopes (361 Voter Centers x 75 CVR for each location)		27,100	\$11,165.20	\$9,485.00
Extra Polling Place Ballot Boxes		1,000	\$4,390.00	\$1,500.00
Set up Charges			\$475.00	
8D2 Cards		100,000	\$11,500.00	\$14,000.00
VIG Inkjet Addressing		535,000	\$27,820.00	\$37,450.00
		Pre Total	\$424,831.00	\$458,692.00
		Plus \$45k With 10% Pre-Pay Discount		\$503,692.00 \$453,322.80
Assumed factors		Post Total	\$424,831.00	\$453,322.80
1 card 18" ballot VBM Ballots Mailed included ballot cost plus assembly cost.				

Pro Document Solutions
Balance Sheet
December 31, 2022

ASSETS

Current Assets		
Cash in Bank	\$	6,965,155.66
Accounts Receivable		1,830,550.04
C/P of Due from Related Parties		0.00
Inventory		2,530,602.04
Prepaid Expenses		142,061.09
Exchange		1,246.96
		<hr/>
Total Current Assets		11,469,615.79
Property and Equipment		
Furniture & Equipment: Paso		3,389,081.78
Furniture & Equipment: Port		8,164,256.39
Vehicles: Paso		7,574.00
Vehicles: Port		93,495.54
Computer Equipment: Paso		124,749.39
Computer Equipment: Port		87,348.42
Leasehold Improvements Paso		333,911.95
Leasehold Improvements Port		911,434.40
Less Accumulated Depreciation		(12,951,083.26)
		<hr/>
Total Property and Equipment		160,768.61
Intangible Assets		
Goodwill - SVS Purchase		1,183,129.00
Loan Fees		42,770.00
Accumulated Amortization		(1,142,834.92)
Accum Amort - Loan Fees		(42,770.00)
		<hr/>
Total Intangibles - Net		40,294.08
Other Assets		
Vendor Prepayments and Deposit		(411.46)
Deposits - Workers Comp		0.00
Due from Related Parties		203,586.98
		<hr/>
Total Other Assets		203,175.52
Total Assets	\$	<u><u>11,873,854.00</u></u>

Pro Document Solutions
Balance Sheet
December 31, 2022


LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL

Current Liabilities	
Accounts Payable	\$ 207,211.01
Notes Payable	0.00
Current Portion of Notes	423,083.00
Accrued Sales Tax 2017-19 Audt	(32,237.14)
Accrued Sales Tax	26,976.83
Accrued Expenses	565,558.59
Customer Deposits	(382.71)
Deferred Taxes	0.00
State & Fed Income Tax Payable	838,714.00
	2,028,923.58
Total Current Liabilities	
Long-Term Liabilities	
SVS Purchase Liability	(3,200.00)
Less Current Portion of Notes	(423,083.00)
Canon C10010VP Cap FMV Lease	183,021.56
IFS Cap Lease #1 - MBO 0012146	672,694.89
IFS Cap Lease #2-VIDEK 0012233	178,431.11
PNC Bank - Screen InkJet Press	305,268.41
PNC Bank - Screen Finishing	66,351.33
PPB *1417 W+D Loan	129,024.00
NW Mutual Life Loan	19,074.37
	1,127,582.67
Total Long-Term Liabilities	
Total Liabilities	
Capital	
Preferred Stock - Series E	0.00
Common Stock	443,409.48
Owner's Drawing	0.00
Retained Earnings	4,743,068.36
Net Income	3,530,869.91
	8,717,347.75
Total Capital	
Total Liabilities & Capital	
	\$ 11,873,854.00


PROVOTE CA COUNTY CUSTOMER LIST

County	Number of Registered Voters	Registrar of Voters/Elections Director	County Contact Information			
			Email	Phone Number	Fax Number	Physical/Mailing Address
Butte County, CA	123,935	Keaton Denlay	elections@buttecounty.net	530-552-3400	530-538-6853	155 Nelson Ave, Oroville, CA 95965-3411
Calaveras County, CA	32,172	Rebecca Turner	electionsweb@co.calaveras.ca.us	209-754-5376	209-754-5733	891 Mountain Ranch Road, San Andreas, CA 95249
Colusa County, CA	10,144	Crisby Jayne Edwards	clerkinfo@countyofcolusa.org	530-458-0500	530-458-0512	546 Jay Street, Suite 200, Colusa, CA 95932
Del Norte County, CA	14,943	Alissia Northrup	anorthrup@co.del-norte.ca.us	707-464-7216	707-465-0321	981 H Street, Room 160, Crescent City, CA 95531
El Dorado County, CA	138,537	Bill O'Neill	elections@edco.gov.us	530-621-7480	530-626-5514	2850 Fairlane Court, Placerville, CA 95667
Glenn County, CA	14,346	Sendy Perez	elections@countyofglenn.net	530-934-6414	530-934-6571	516 W. Sycamore Street, 2nd Floor, Willows, CA 95988
Imperial County, CA	86,942	Linsey J. Dale	linseydale@co.imperial.ca.us	442-265-1060	442-265-1062	940 W. Main Street, Suite 206, El Centro, CA 92243
Inyo County, CA	10,729	Danielle Sexton	dsexton@inyocounty.us	760-878-0224	760-878-1805	168 N. Edwards Street, Independence, CA 93526
Kern County, CA	435,872	Aimee X. Espinoza	elections@co.kern.ca.us	661-868-3590	661-868-3768	1115 Truxtun Avenue, First Floor, Bakersfield, CA 93301
Kings County, CA	61,535	Lupe Villa	Elections@CountyofKings.com	559-852-4401	559-585-8453	1400 W. Lacey Blvd, Bldg. #7, Hanford, CA 93230
Lake County, CA	37,154	Maria Valadez	elections@lakecountyca.gov	707-263-2372	707-263-2742	325 N. Forbes Street, Lakeport, CA 95453
Los Angeles County, CA	5,601,835	Dean Logan	voterinfo@rcc.lacounty.gov	800-815-2666	562-929-4790	12400 Imperial Hwy., Norwalk, CA 90650
Madera County, CA	72,865	Rebecca Martinez	electionsinfo@co.madera.ca.gov	559-675-7720	559-675-7870	200 W. 4th Street, Madera, CA 93637
Mariposa County, CA	11,558	Cortney Pronager Morrow	cmorrow@mariposacounty.org	209-966-2007	209-966-6496	Hall of Records, 4982 10th Street, Mariposa, CA 95338
Mono County, CA	7,710	Scheerren Dedman	elections@mono.ca.gov	760-932-5537	760-932-5531	74 N. School Street, Annex I, Bridgeport, CA 93517
Napa County, CA	83,480	John Tubeur	elections@co.napa.ca.us	707-253-4321	707-253-4390	1127 First St. Ste. E, Napa, CA 94559
Plumas County, CA	13,848	Marcy DeMartile	elections@countyofplumas.com	530-283-6256	530-283-6155	920 Main Street, Room 102, Courthouse, Quincy, CA 95971
Riverside County, CA	1,310,505	Matthew Ceballos		951-486-7200	951-486-7272	2724 Gateway Drive, Riverside, CA 92507-0918
San Luis Obispo County, CA	182,340	Elaina Cano	elections@co.slo.ca.us	805-781-5228	805-781-1111	1055 Monterey Street, Suite D-12, San Luis Obispo, CA 93408
Sierra County, CA	2,219	Heather Foster	hfoster@sierracounty.ca.gov	530-289-3395	530-289-2830	100 Courthouse Square, Room 11, P.O. Drawer D, Downieville, CA 95936-0398
Siskiyou County, CA	28,745	Laura Bynum	lbura@siskvotes.org	530-842-5084	530-841-4110	311 Fourth Street, Room 201, Yreka, CA 96097
Sonoma County, CA	304,017	Deva Marie Proto	Deva.Proto@sonoma-county.org	707-565-6800	707-565-6843	435 Fiscal Drive, Santa Rosa, CA 95403
Stanislaus County, CA	282,393	Donna Linder	stanvotes@stancounty.com	209-525-5200	209-525-5802	1021 I Street, Suite 101, Modesto, CA 95354-2331
Sutter County, CA	52,896	Donna M. Johnston	DJohnston@co.sutter.ca.us	530-822-7122	530-822-7587	1435 Veterans Memorial Circle, Yuba City, CA 95993
Tehama County, CA	57,131	Jennifer Vise	jvise@co.tehama.ca.us	530-527-8190	530-527-1140	633 Washington Street, Room 17, Red Bluff, CA 96080
Tulare County, CA	208,863	Michelle Baldwin	MBaldwin@tularecounty.ca.gov	559-624-7300	559-737-4498	5951 S. Mooney Blvd., Visalia, CA 93277
Yolo County, CA	118,797	Jesse Salinas	elections@yolocounty.org	916-375-6490	530-666-8123	625 Court Street, Room B-05, Woodland, CA 95695
Yuba County, CA	41,212	Donna Hillagass	elections@co.yuba.ca.us	530-749-7855	530-749-7854	915 8th Street, Suite 107, Marysville, CA 95901-5273


GHOSTmark™



CONFIDENTIAL
STANDARD VIEWING SHOWS NO MARK



CONFIDENTIAL
INVISIBLE UV MARK CUSTOM PER ELECTION



CONFIDENTIAL
MARK ALSO CONTAINS RARE IR TAGGANT

Secure Ballot Paper



in partnership with



A WHITE PAPER FOR DISCUSSION ON PAPER BALLOT SECURITY

Leveraging our backgrounds in security printing, ProVoteSolutions and ISP have carefully considered the benefits of a print-based ballot security feature.

This white paper focuses on the following primary points:

- Why the “need” for print or paper-based ballot security?
- Why was this technology ultimately chosen and created?
- What is a GHOSTmark™ seal?

Why Is There A Need?

In the last few years, the news cycles have demonstrated that election integrity and concerns over security have become a significant part of our national conversation. Having been in election printing for over 20 years, and a leader in security printing for over 30 years, we understand the foundation of security begins and ends with the strength of the security technology and a proper chain of custody. The slightest perception of a security breach, whether valid or not, brings into question the integrity of an entire system.

Our nation's elections are at the pinnacle of this exposure.

The states, counties, and system providers have done a good job providing voters with an election system that provides security through tight controls, certifications, and chain of custody policies. Still, there are instances that a chain of custody policy may fall under public scrutiny. A more comprehensive ballot security feature, outside of typical public access, would help alleviate those concerns and assure trust within the voting public.

In short, all security within a printed paper ballot is based upon its chain of custody alone. Since there are multiple paper suppliers and printing methods, the raw materials do not inherently provide security through chain of custody.



"Rated number one document security technology provider in the US for 7 years in a row"

Why the GHOSTmark™ technology?

With 20 technology patents, our experience in security development enables us to provide effective solutions which encompass all security technologies; including true paper watermarks, security inks, holograms, and encrypted anti-copy backgrounds. Our experience in election printing gives us the insight to understand the feasibility of solutions when considering cost and logistics. Given the sheer volume and limited timeframe inherent in election printing, it is critical that a printed ballot security feature not interfere with 100% accuracy and 100% on-time delivery.

In order to be most effective, ProVote**Solutions** and ISP determined the GHOSTmark™ security feature should meet the following minimum requirements:



- Require minimal investment, achieving a high value to cost ratio. The current targeted cost is roughly \$0.05 per ballot depending on quantity, coverage, and application.
- Will work with all election systems and certified papers.
- Can be offered in two options: Either totally covert (invisible), or partially overt (visible) so voters can also verify its presence.
- Offer levels of validation that are easy to relay to voters and election workers. With the overt option it's possible to alert the voting public of the security feature and describe what to look for on the ballot itself.
- The public is already somewhat familiar with watermarks, but broader adoption would increase familiarity (like currency).
- Both options offer embedded covert security, making higher level forensic validation possible.
- Capable of being printed by all certified printers with offset presses.
- Can be customized by state, county, and/or specific elections.
- Using GHOSTmark™ security seal creates a ballot in which the paper is further secured by chain of custody and not commonly available to the public.
- Securing the reply envelope was considered. It was determined that the ballot itself is the best and most important option for the application of the GHOSTmark™ security seal since it is archived in the record.

What is GHOSTmark™?

GHOSTmark™ security seal is a high-resolution printed image, utilizing a unique security ink with several overt and covert properties embedded within it. The GHOSTmark™ technology is patent pending.

Since most ballots are digitally printed (in-plant, on demand, thermal, etc.), GHOSTmark™ security seal was designed outside the ability of digital printing. The combination of high-resolution imaging and ink technology within the seal are beyond the capabilities of any digital device.

GHOSTmark™ security seal can be customized for a state, county, or any specific election without creating anything that can be traceable to the voter for privacy reasons.





What is GHOSTmark™?

GHOSTmark™ security seal ink properties can be broken into the following layers:

- With the overt option, the ink is approximately the same color as the paper. This is also known as a reflective watermark, not to be confused with current watermarks printed in the ballot head. The reflective watermark is mostly visible when tilting toward or away from a strong light source.
- With the covert option, the ink is totally invisible, so the voter does not know the security exists on the ballot.
- Among the ink additives is an invisible UV pigment which excites (glows) under a black light. The image is easily visible in any environment because of the pigment colors chosen.
- Also embedded in the ink are rare infrared (IR) taggants which are designed to excite in the infrared spectrum. These are commonly validated using small readers which can recognize the IR properties and return a response (lights, beeps, buzzes, etc.). This rare taggant is mostly impervious and can survive both chemicals and fire.

With the overt option, the reflective watermark could be validated by the voter. If they had a black light, they could potentially verify the UV, too.

The UV and rare IR properties would typically be validated by an election official or someone who would have the necessary device and training to confirm the feature.



GHOSTmark™ Implementation

This technology is an ideal solution for the election environment. ProVote**Solutions** and ISP are now accepting applications for counties who wish to participate in pilot programs and scaled testing. But we are also seeking to achieve additional milestones in order to further implement GHOSTmark™ security seal.

- Guidance, approval, and certification of Secretaries of State and proper election stakeholders.
- Confirmation of compatibility from the election system providers.

This is an optimum time to enhance voter trust by adding layered security to increase the chain of custody security inherent to ballots. GHOSTmark™ security seal certainly deters ballot counterfeiting efforts. But more importantly, it provides voter confidence that our elections are secure.

We appreciate all input during this exploratory stage. Contact us directly if you would like to explore GHOSTmark™ security seal for your county.


Sincerely,

Noal Phillips, President
International Security Products, Inc.
(805) 423-0306



Paul Mantey, President
ProVoteSolutions
(559) 719-2134





www.provotesolutions.com

info@provotesolutions.com

Phone: 1 (800) 681-1171

Fax: 1 (800) 233-1086



ITEM #11
11/07/2023

Subject: IVS contract
Attachments: IVS letter to the board.docx; Company linked to ballot bungle in Sanpete County has history of errors, financial troubles.pdf; Provote errors.zip

From: Eric Kozlowski <erick@thepresort.com>
Sent: Monday, November 6, 2023 1:54 PM
To: District 2 <district2@fresnocountyca.gov>
Subject: IVS contract

CAUTION!!! - EXTERNAL EMAIL - THINK BEFORE YOU CLICK

Please see the attached

Thanks,

Eric Kozlowski

559-906-2003 Cell

WARNING/CONFIDENTIAL:

This email, including attachments, may contain information that is privileged, confidential, personal and/or exempt from disclosure under applicable law (including, but not limited to, protected health information). It is not intended for transmission to, or receipt by, any unauthorized persons. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you believe this email was sent to you in error, do not read it. Reply to the sender informing them of the error and then destroy all copies and attachments of the message from your system. Thank you.

496 S. Uruapan Way
Dinuba, California 93618



Phone: (559) 498-0281
Fax: (559) 498-6585

November 6, 2023

Fresno County Board of Supervisors,

Integrated Voting Systems Inc's ownership group has been providing services to Fresno County since the 1980's. We have been a pillar in the community. Since 1995 we have donated 20 full ride scholarships to Fresno State, given over \$400,000.00 to channel 18 and donated \$50,000.00 to Community hospital for expansion. This is just a sampling of what we have done for the Fresno County community. We currently employ over 60 Fresno County employees.

We have enjoyed over a 20-year partnership with the Fresno County Elections Dept. We have never had any elections related issues during that period.

Let me address some of the public comments from the last board meeting.

Integrated Voting Solutions Inc. has been prohibited to do business in the state by the SOS. Solutions, Eric, and Ronda Kozlowski company is prohibited. The stock in this company was turned over to the trustee in our bankruptcy and was not a priority claim. The company cannot be dissolved in this state and therefore is still listed with the SOS.

Integrated Voting Systems Inc., formed in August of 2015, a full year prior to Eric and Ronda's bankruptcy, has always been permitted to do business in the State and has always been in good standing with the State. The companies have shared the same address because Systems bought out Solutions customers and equipment prior to and during the bankruptcy of the Kozlowski's.

Montross County, the county provided us with a ballot that had the wrong election date programmed into the ballot. The county chose to do inhouse Logic and Accuracy testing of the ballots with inhouse printed ballots and not the ones produced by us. They caught the date error, changed it, but never followed through with testing our printed ballots. Thus, we printed and mailed the incorrect ballot. As you can see from the attached article, the IVS rep. that made statements to the press that it was human error on our part was sued by us and we reached an out of court settlement.

The attached article also shows how IVS responded to the signature line being left off the reply envelope. This was done by a third-party vendor, and we stepped up and took responsibility. The only error in this article is the total amount of the bankruptcy. It was for only 4.5 million and not 120 million.

I have also included articles of the next bidder that is in consideration by the board for a contract. Pro-Vote Solutions has had many issues over the years with providing error free elections. After 2018 (the Montross issue) San Luis Obispo County chose to leave IVS. The county had election issues with Pro-Vote in both the 2020 presidential election and the 2022 general election cycles. This happened with the county making the switch with plenty of time before either election. The current presidential primary election is the most complicated election that California does every four years. We are already past the point where the elections office and its vendor should have started preparing for the election.

We urged the board to consider this in making its decision on the one-year proposal to continue with IVS.

Thank You for your time,

Eric Kozlowski
Interim COE Integrated Voting Systems Inc.

496 S. Uruapan Way
Dinuba, California 93618



Phone: (559) 498-0281
Fax: (559) 498-6585



Report this ad



The Salt Lake Tribune

SUBSCRIBE

LOG IN


SUBSCRIBE



Company linked to ballot bungle in Sanpete County has history of errors, financial troubles



By Zak Podmore | Oct. 16, 2020, 5:00 a.m. | Updated: 8:35 a.m.

 Comment

The private company that mailed 13,000 ballots with a missing signature line to voters in Sanpete County has a history of financial troubles and printing errors, according to court filings, news articles and interviews.

Integrated Voting Systems (IVS), a Dinuba, Calif.-based company, came under scrutiny this week after Sanpete County voters opened their ballots on Tuesday to find that the critical signature line on the ballot envelopes was mistakenly left blank.

County staff and IVS scrambled to address the error and inform voters of the steps they could take to submit their signatures, and Sanpete County Clerk Sandy Neill said she has been satisfied with the company's response. As soon as the error was discovered Tuesday, Neill said IVS rushed to mail postcards to every affected voter, explaining the missing signature line and listing steps voters could take to ensure their ballot would still be counted.



It is not the first time IVS has been blamed for Montrose County, Colo., said the company must necessitating a laborious hand count. (In a lawsuit filed by IVS last year, company

the Montrose incident. The case appears to have been settled out of court, and the contractor did not return a request for comment Thursday.)

Sevier County Clerk Steven Wall said his office signed a contract with IVS several years ago after the county's previous ballot vendor raised prices. He called the company "pretty good to work with," though he said signature lines were left blank on ballots in a recent municipal election in his county as well.



Report this ad

"They didn't print on the back of the envelope, on the back of that flap," Wall said. "It was basically the same thing that happened to Sanpete only it was a lot smaller group because it was just a small town; it wasn't the whole county." IVS assumed the cost of mailing postcards to affected voters as it did in Sanpete County this week.

Tooele County Clerk Marilyn Gillette said her county also contracts with IVS and called it an "excellent company" in an email last month.

Utah does not regulate which companies counties can contract with to print and mail ballots, and there is no public list of ballot vendors used in the state. The Salt Lake Tribune found clerks are contracting with at least seven different ballot vendors this election, and at least one county, Emery, is pri



IVS is on a list of approved vendors in California business in the state was temporarily frozen in taxes.

And following the Montrose County misprint, [Sentinel](#) uncovered a history of debt and questionable dealings linked to IVS, which us



Report this ad

In 2018, IVS' CEO denied a connection between the two similarly named entities in a statement to the Fresno Bee, but a 2020 list of state-approved ballot vendors in California links the two companies.

Contacted Wednesday, a spokesperson for IVS declined to comment on the error in Sanpete County, and a voicemail left for a company executive was not immediately returned on Thursday.

As was first reported in the Sentinel, Integrated Voting Solutions' founder Eric Kozlowski and his wife Ronda filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2016 with their creditors — which included banks, credit card companies, title companies and contractors — claiming the couple owed over \$122 million in debt.

Kozlowski said in court filings that he retired from the ballot vending business in 2015 around the same time the new company Integrated Voting Systems was registered to his then-teenage daughter, Rebecca Kozlowski, who still is listed as the company's officer, president and director on the most recent [business filings with the Utah Department of Commerce](#).

The website [integravote.com](#) was used by Inte; in 2004 to around 2015 when the company su infringement laws for registering [integravote.r](#) Integrated Voting Systems.



Attorneys for Eric Kozlowski's creditors argued in court documents that the name change was designed to make the bankruptcy proceedings more favorable to the businessman, but Eric Kozlowski said his daughter, then a college student, had founded the company independently with trust fund money and the help of a family acquaintance.

The bankruptcy proceedings concluded in 2018, and Eric and Ronda Kozlowski were required to pay \$2.8 million to those making claims against them. The remaining \$119.7 million in claims were discharged without payment.

Neill, the Sanpete County clerk, said a separate ballot vendor mistake in the presidential primary in February where around 250 voters received the wrong party's ballots was the result of an error made by a different ballot vendor, not IVS.

"[That company] didn't know who got the wrong ballots," Neill said, so there was no way to easily contact affected voters. "It was a nightmare. It was unacceptable."

Neill said Sanpete signed a contract with IVS this spring and didn't have any problems in the June primary. She was glad to see IVS take responsibility in responding to the recent error, including by assuming the cost of mailing postcards.

F

A proof of the ballot envelope reviewed by her signature line, Neill added.

Neill said IVS hasn't invoiced the county yet for the error, so she doesn't know if it will offer any discounts to cover the cost of the error this week to help deal with the missing signature line.

11/6/23, 12:24 PM

Company linked to ballot bungle in Sanpete County has history of errors, financial troubles

said Wednesday he had no comment beyond those of the county clerk.

Zak Podmore is a Report for America corps member for The Salt Lake Tribune. Your donation to match our RFA grant helps keep him writing stories like this one; please consider making a tax-deductible gift of any amount today by clicking [here](#).



zpodmore@sltrib.com
Follow @zak_podmore

Donate to the newsroom now. The Salt Lake Tribune, Inc. is a 501(c)(3) public charity and contributions are tax deductible.

Ballot error produces 183 invalid votes

The voter called election officials the Friday after election day, and the department notified the county's contracted ballot printer immediately and investigated. They found about 400 voters in the Madera area had been sent ballots that included the extra race.

"We were able to isolate most of the returned vote-by-mail ballots and correct the error. Approximately 183 incorrect ballots were counted," said Elections Division manager Stephanie Sibley, who noted that those who voted at a vote center received correct ballots.

The ballot printer, ProVote Solutions of Porterville, told officials it was able to identify both the mistake and the remedy to prevent it from happening again. The company has clients in 40 countries, it claims, and handled ballots for 42 U.S. counties in five states in 2008.

This isn't the first time a ballot error has been made by ProVote Solutions. Another mistake in 2010 resulted in Sonoma County ballots being sent to the wrong voting block, according to The Press Democrat. About 15,600 voters had to be sent corrected ballots in that incident.

ProVote Solutions could not be reached for comment before press time.

Madera County said it notified affected candidates after determining which ballots were affected. The issue only impacted the outcome of the close race for Madera Unified School District trustee for area 5, the elections department said Nov. 16.

Final local election results can be viewed online at votemadera.com.



Download Now

PDF Conversion Simplified Download Now

County of Santa Clara

Office of the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors
County Government Center, East Wing
70 West Hedding Street
San Jose, California 95110-1770
(408) 299-5001 FAX 298-8460 TDD 993-8272



Maria Marinos
Clerk of the Board

FILED

SEP 12 2011

DAVID H. YAMASAKI
Chief Executive Officer, Clerk
Superior Court of CA County of Santa Clara
BY D. ALDYCK

August 17, 2011

The Honorable Richard J. Loftus, Jr.
Presiding Judge
Santa Clara County Superior Court
191 North First Street
San Jose, CA 95113

RE: Grand Jury Report: Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters Errors in June 2010
Election Ballot Mailing

Dear Judge Loftus:

At the August 9, 2011 meeting of the County of Santa Clara Board of Supervisors (Item No. 17), the Board adopted the response from the County Administration to the Final Grand Jury Report and recommendations relating to Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters Errors in June 2010 Election Ballot Mailing.

As directed by the Board of Supervisors and on behalf of the Board President, our office is forwarding to you the enclosed certified copy of the response to the Final Grand Jury Report with the cover memorandum from Mr. Graves. This response constitutes the response of the Board of Supervisors, consistent with provisions of California Penal Section 933(c).

If there are any questions concerning this issue, please contact our office at 299-5001 or by email at maria.marinos@cob.sccgov.org.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Maria Marinos".
MARIA MARINOS
Clerk, Board of Supervisors
County of Santa Clara

Enclosures

MM/mm

County of Santa Clara
Office of the County Executive



CE07 080911

DATE:

Approved as amended
Meeting Date: August 9, 2011
Processor Name: Melissa Miller
Item Number: 17

TO:

Board of Supervisors

FROM:

Handwritten signature of Gary A. Graves.

Gary A. Graves
Chief Operating Officer

SUBJECT: Response to Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury Report: Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters Errors in June 2010 Election Ballot Mailing.

RECOMMENDED ACTION

Consider recommendations relating to Final Grand Jury Report relating to Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters Errors in June 2010 Election Ballot Mailing.

Possible action:

- a. Adopt response from Administration to Final Grand Jury Report relating to Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters Errors in June 2010 Election Ballot Mailing.

AND

- b. Authorize the Board President and Clerk of the Board of Supervisors to forward department response to Grand Jury report to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court

with approval that responses constitute the response of the Board of Supervisors, consistent with provisions of California Penal Code Section 933 (c).

OR

- c. Adopt a separate or amended response to the Final Grand Jury Report relating to Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters Errors in June 2010 Election Ballot Mailing, and authorize the Board President and Clerk of the Board to forward response to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court.

FISCAE IMPLICATIONS

There are no fiscal implications associated with these Board actions.

REASONS FOR RECOMMENDATION

This is a response to the Grand Jury's Final Report of the Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters Errors in June 2010 Election Ballot Mailing, which has been completed pursuant to the California Penal Code, Section 933(c) and 933.05(a). The Department response to the Grand Jury's findings is provided as an attachment.

Child Impact Statement

The recommended action will have no neutral impact on children and youth.

BACKGROUND

A complaint was received by the Civil Grand Jury alleging that ballots for the June 2010 election were sent to voters who had moved out of the state and were no longer eligible to vote in the County of Santa Clara. A Grand Jury investigation revealed that a mailing error occurring in the June 2010 Primary Election for Santa Clara County. The Grand Jury further determined that the bulk mailing vendor contracted by the County's Registrar of Voters (ROV) forwarded 7,668 election ballots through the National Change of Address (NCOA) database without the permission of the ROV.

The Grand Jury's report makes three specific findings; the Registrar of Voters agrees with two of the findings and disagrees with one. Additionally, the Grand Jury makes five recommendations; ROV agrees with four recommendations and disagrees with one.

CONSEQUENCES OF NEGATIVE ACTION

The County would not be in compliance with the law in responding to the Grand Jury's Final Report.

STEPS FOLLOWING APPROVAL

Following approval of the response provided by the Registrar of Voters, forward all comments of the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors to the Honorable Richard J. Loftus, Jr., Presiding Judge, Santa Clara County Superior Court on or before Tuesday, August 30, 2011.

ATTACHMENTS

- Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury Final Report
- Registrar of Voters Response

County of Santa Clara


Registrar of Voters

1555 Berger Drive, Building 2
San Jose, California 95112
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 1147, San Jose, CA 95108
(408) 299-VOTE (8683) (866) 430-VOTE (8683) FAX (408) 996-7314
www.sccvote.org



July 15, 2011

TO: Gary Graves, Chief Operating Officer

FROM: 

Elaine Larson, Acting Registrar of Voters

SUBJECT: **Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury Report, "Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters Errors in June 2010 Election Ballot Mailing"**

This memo responds to the findings and recommendations in the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury Report, dated May 27, 2011, subject as above.

Grand Jury Finding 1: As a result of the mail distributor not following ROV procedure, 7,668 ballots were erroneously mailed to addresses not consistent with ROV records.

Grand Jury Recommendation 1A: The ROV should review its ballot-handling procedures to ensure the ballot-handling process is fully documented.

Grand Jury Recommendation 1B: The ROV should ensure the written procedure is attached to or referenced in contracts, communicated with mailing vendors, and re-communicated periodically, depending on change in procedure or change in vendor personnel.

Registrar of Voters Response to Finding 1: The Registrar of Voters (ROV) agrees with this finding. The mailing house vendor performed a United States Postal Service (USPS) National Change of Address (NCOA) update on the data file provided by ROV. The vendor stated that this NCOA processing has become a standard process for most clients to meet a new postal requirement enacted in November 2008 that bulk mailing address data be updated via NCOA or a similar method prior to mailing. However, ROV has always opted out of the vendor providing this service, preferring instead to handle all address changes in-house. Subsequent to the mailing, the vendor realized its error and notified ROV.

Registrar of Voters Response to Recommendation 1A: ROV agrees with this recommendation and has begun to implement it. After the June 2010 election, ROV met with the mailing house vendor and began working to update its ballot

handling procedures. ROV believes the current procedures are comprehensive. ROV will continue to be proactive in keeping procedures, instructions to vendors, and documentation up-to-date and will closely monitor all mailing house operations. See Attachment 1.

Registrar of Voters Response to Recommendation 1B: ROV agrees with this recommendation and has reviewed and revised all ballot handling procedures. ROV updated the instructions that will be given to the mailing house vendor to include specific prohibitions on any modification of the voter address information provided by ROV. ROV has instituted a process to communicate these instructions prior to every election, ensuring that the most current procedures will be communicated. Specific language will be added to future contracts.

Grand Jury Finding 2: Adequate measures do not exist to ensure that the mailing vendor updates addresses solely from ROV-received data.

Grand Jury Recommendation 2: The ROV should develop and include within its written procedures a process describing how address changes are to be updated. That process should include safeguards such as a written acknowledgment by the mail distributor that it has updated its mailing list only from the ROV list. The process should require the mail distributor to return a signed form attesting that it followed the written procedure.

Registrar of Voters Response to Finding 2: ROV does not agree with this finding. Mailing vendors are instructed to NOT alter addresses supplied by the ROV. Given that there is a prohibition for mailing vendors to update any address supplied by the ROV there is no necessity for any measure involving when a mailing vendor is supposed to update addresses. ROV does acknowledge that additional measures could have been in place to ensure the mailing vendor did not update the addresses.

Registrar of Voters Response to Recommendation 2: Based on our response to Finding 2, ROV does not agree that any written acknowledgment about how a mail distributor is to change address is appropriate as we require and prohibit a mail distributor to make modifications or updates to the address list supplied by the ROV. A written acknowledgement as to the prohibition is appropriate and has been implemented. See Attachment 2.

Grand Jury Finding 3: Instructions to voters to recast ballots are unclear. The ROV failed to communicate clearly to voters who received improper ballots that their initial ballots were voided. As a result, some voters may not have voted using the correct ballots and remained unaware that their first ballot had been voided. Thus, for some, without their knowledge their votes may not have been counted.

Grand Jury Recommendation 3A: Written communication with voters whose ballots are voided should clearly state that fact.

Grand Jury Recommendation 3B: For those voters whose initial ballots are voided and who are still eligible to vote, correct ballots should be sent with a letter clearly stating that if they had previously voted on the incorrect ballot that they must vote again using the new ballot enclosed for their vote to be counted.

Registrar of Voters Response to Finding 3: ROV agrees with this finding. The Vote by Mail Division should have mailed a letter of explanation along with the required form.

Registrar of Voters Response to Recommendations 3A&B: ROV agrees with these recommendations and has created a new form letter to send to voters in the event that their ballots need to be voided for reasons other than their own request. The letter includes a clear statement that the voided ballot will not be counted and that the voter will need to complete and return the new ballot to ensure that their votes can be counted for the contests in which they are eligible. See Attachment 3.

ROV appreciates the feedback received from the Grand Jury and will continue to make improvements in all phases of Vote by Mail Operations by maintaining better documentation of procedures, tightening controls on vendors, and improving communications with voters. ROV places the highest importance on the integrity and transparency of the election process and takes seriously any opportunity to improve its processes.


Attachments:

- Attachment 1 – Ballot Issuance Procedures
- Attachment 2 – Vendor Data Handling Procedures
- Attachment 3 – Voided Ballot Voter Notification Letter

Cc: Luke Leung, Deputy County Executive
Susan Swain, Lead Deputy County Counsel

The foregoing instrument is a correct copy of the original.

ATTEST: Maria Marinos
Clerk of the Board

By: 
Deputy Clerk

Date: AUG 09 2011

Attachment 1

BALLOT ISSUANCE PROCEDURES

Background

Vote by Mail applications are to be processed during a prescribed window between the 29th and the 7th day prior to the election. Any applications received by the elections official prior to the 29th day shall be kept and processed during the application period.

Any registered voter can apply for Permanent Vote by Mail Status. Ballots will automatically be mailed to all active voters with Permanent Vote by Mail Status starting 29 days before the election.

Scope

This procedure will pertain to issuing Vote by Mail Ballots by mail to Military/Overseas Voters, Permanent VBM Voters, and one-time VBM Voters.

Procedures and Processing

A. BALLOT ORDER OVERVIEW

To be performed by VBM Manager:

1. Send ballot order and finishing specs to ballot printing and mailing house vendors on E-60
2. Set up a meeting and/or conference call with ballot printing and mailing house vendors to review procedures and requirements (see sample, Attachment A)
3. Receive & proof ballot runsheet & specs from ballot printing vendor (see sample, Attachment B)
 - a. Confirm ballot specs with Ballot Layout (see sample, Attachment C)
 - b. Compare ballot types and languages to plate code list provided by ballot Layout
 - c. Compare serial numbers to quantities in VBM ballot order
4. Run data files for ballot printing & mail house vendors on E-45 (run Mail Ballots first, then Perm VBM)
5. Receive signed Data Processing Checklist from mailing house vendor (see sample, Attachment D)
 - a. Confirm that only Ancillary Service Endorsement has been marked Yes (Y) in the "Completed" column; FASTforward, NCOALink, and ACS must not be completed
 - b. Data Processing Checklist must be approved and returned to vendor before any ballot printing or mailing activities can commence
6. Upon receipt of ballots, quality control procedures must be performed both at the ROV office and at the mailing house vendor's facility, pursuant to the "Optical Scan Quality Control" procedures

Attachment 1

BALLOT ORDER GENERATION

Draft voters into the election

1. In EIMS, go to Election Workspace and select the current election, then go to Election Menu and select Election Checklist
2. In the Election Checklist, go to Draft Voters into Election, then choose the "Add (append) voters" option and click Draft Voters into Election

Set ballot order parameters

3. Return to the Election Checklist and go to Setup Ballot Order Parameters
4. Set the parameters according to the election type, then save:
 - a. Regular election
 - AV: 10% (ROV Vote by Mail in-house stock)
 - PCT: 75% (Precinct supply)
 - Perm PSI: 101% (Vote by Mail for delivery by mailing house)
 - b. Mail ballot election
 - Mail Ballot: 5% (ROV in-house stock)
 - MB PSI: 101% (For delivery by mailing house)
 - c. General parameters
 - Minimum order: 0
 - Multiples of: 50 for Spanish, 10 for other languages
 - All unused parameters: 0

Generate ballot order

5. Return to Election Checklist and go to Generate Ballot Order

Proof ballot order

6. Return to the Election Checklist and go to Proof Ballot Order
7. Click red icon next to save to update the ballot serial numbers for all ballot types and languages

Extract ballot order

8. Exit Election Checklist and go to Elections Workspace Reports
9. Select EWMJ006 Ballot Order Data Extract
10. Set report parameters:
 - a. Ballot Order Item
 - Regular Elections: run separate jobs for AV, PCT, and PERM PSI
 - Mail Ballot Elections: run separate jobs for Mail Ballot and MB PSI
 - b. Save Ballot Order Extract to: rov-printfile\d\AVM Envelopes\ <election date> \ <file name>

Submit ballot order

11. Retrieve ballot order files
12. Sum the total number of ballots ordered by language
13. Create summary spreadsheet (see example)

Attachment 1

dtElectionDate	BallotOrderItemDesc	LANGUAGE	Seq	Card A	Totals
	MB - PSI	SPANISH -	1	139,826	
	MB - PSI	CHINESE -	2	7,283	
	MB - PSI	TAGALOG -	3	462	
	MB - PSI	VIETNAMESE -	4	1,019	
					148,590
	MB - ROV	SPANISH -	1	7,000	
	MB - ROV	CHINESE -	2	390	
	MB - ROV	TAGALOG -	3	50	
	MB - ROV	VIETNAMESE -	4	70	
					7,510
		total		156,100	156,100

14. Send ballot order files with summary spreadsheet to vendor
15. Complete Request for State Ballot Release Activity Form with total ballot order +10% contingency and submit to CA Secretary of State

B. BALLOT DATA FILE CREATION INSTRUCTIONS

To be performed by VBM Manager or designee in three phases:

1. Run Military-Overseas on E-60
2. Run data files for ballot printing & mail house vendors on E-45 (run mail ballots first)
3. Run updated files daily beginning E-29 through E-7

***Note: Refer to "Checklist of Items That Must Be Printed on the Return Address Envelope" prior to running data files (see sample, Attachment E)**

Instructions:

1. In EIMS, go to Election Workspace and select the current election.
2. Go to Absentee Processing Menu and select Autogenerate Groups
3. Select Absentee Status as applicable (leave blank for Mail Ballot)
4. Mail Ballot Check Box: only check when running Mail Ballot Precincts (run first before regular VBM voters)
5. Select Languages (for in-house ballots, do 2 runs: 1st E/S, 2nd C/V/T)
6. Select all Parties
7. Select Application Method
8. Set Application Status to Good
9. Select Ballot Issue Type
10. Run the job ("printer" icon)
11. Repeat steps 2-10 for each absentee status and/or language as appropriate
12. Go to AV Group Control
13. Select the radio button for Autogenerated
14. Note the ID numbers and quantities on the VBM Envelope Job Log
15. Highlight all the groups of the same type (ex. all Mail Ballot E/S)

Attachment 1

16. Click Issue Envelopes (bottom left corner of window)
17. Confirm the sort order (appearing in red text)
18. Select Extract to File (for vendor files) or Crystal Reports (for in-house ballots)
19. Uncheck political parties (unless in a primary election)
20. Check issue date (should be E-29 for vendor files)
21. Set file name to election's folder
22. Click Submit
23. Repeat steps 15-22 for each absentee status and/or language as appropriate

For Vendor Files: individually archive files into .zip and upload to vendor FTP server

For In-House Ballots: Run EIMS job AVMR140 and proceed to Envelope Inkjet Instructions

C. ENVELOPE INKJET INSTRUCTIONS

1. Go to Desktop of PC connected to Inkjet machine; do not log into EIMS
2. Go to the folder for current election and open the individual Crystal Reports files
3. Load the appropriate envelopes depending on type and language; use AVMR140 for reference
 - a. White for Military/Overseas
 - b. Green for Mail Ballot Precincts
 - c. Blue for all other VBM
 - d. All mail ballot special elections may be assigned a unique envelope color
4. Print the first ten envelopes and visually inspect for print quality; if needed, clean the print heads or adjust the envelope alignment
5. Print the remaining envelopes, visually inspecting for print quality throughout
6. Reprint envelopes with poor print quality based (check sequential number corresponding to page number in Crystal Reports) and destroy old envelopes
7. Forward addressed envelopes to ballot packet assembly

D. BALLOT PACKET ASSEMBLY INSTRUCTIONS


1. Using AVMR140 as a pull list, retrieve the correct quantity of each Ballot Type and language combination for each batch of addressed envelope; log the serial numbers taken in the Ballot Usage Log.
2. Assemble ballot packets containing:
 - a. Outer envelope with window
 - b. Return envelope with inkjet-printed address; make sure the address is visible through the window of the outer envelope
 - c. One complete set of ballot cards of the appropriate Ballot Type and language
 - d. One VBM instruction sheet of the appropriate language (for polling place elections)
 - e. Sample Ballot & Voter Information Pamphlet of the appropriate Ballot Type and Language (for all mail ballot special elections)
 - i. For English voters, 1 English SBVIP
 - ii. For other languages, 1 English SBVIP & 1 SBVIP in preferred language

Attachment 1

3. Run envelopes through postage machine to meter and seal
 - a. Place one piece on the scale to set the appropriate postage (if some sets have a variable number of ballot cards or SBVIPs, they must be metered separately)
 - b. Visually inspect envelopes as they are run to check print quality and ensure back flaps are sealed
4. Record the number of pieces and price in the postage log
5. Place metered ballot packets into white USPS trays and attach "Ballots" tag
6. Deliver ballot packets to Lundy USPS office

Attachment 1

VBM Ballot Issuance Flowchart



ATTACHMENT A

**Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters
Optical Scan Ballot
Finishing and Packaging Specifications**

<p>ROV Precinct Ballot Printing and Finishing (PCT)</p>	<p>2 stubs SCORE - Yes FOLD - IMPRINT On voter's stub -Black ink horizontal, 6 digit consecutive numbering, ballot type, language code, and precinct number on the left On binding stub - 6 digit consecutive number on the right, with 2 staples On Masthead - "PCT" and precinct number</p>
<p>ROV Precinct Ballot Packaging (PCT)</p>	<p>Pack by Precinct Stitch Yes in E/S in 50's, other languages in 25's Shrink wrap - no E/S ballots: pack each precinct in a separate box. Other languages, combine precincts with cardboard between each precinct. #41 box and lid Pack each language combo separately. Use paper stuffing only. No tape on strapping on boxes.</p>
<p>Mailing House Permanent & Mail Ballot Finishing (PERM & MB)</p>	<p>1 stub SCORE - Yes FOLD - Yes IMPRINTS - On Stub - -Black ink horizontal, 6 digit consecutive numbering, ballot type, language code, and precinct number on the left, 2D barcode and readable barcode On Masthead - "MB" or "PERM" and Precinct number</p>
<p>Mailing House Permanent & Mail Ballot Packaging (PERM & MB)</p>	<p>Paper band in 50's or factory option. Use box & lid #41 for 2 column ballot. Pack in mail file sequence number order. Mark sequence number on box. Vendor to save boxes for ROV. Ship to Vendor on postal pallets</p>
<p>ROV Vote by Mail Ballot Printing and Finishing (VBM)</p>	<p>1 stub VBM's do NOT stitch at all. Numbered stub face up and at the top. SCORE - Yes FOLD - Yes IMPRINTS Black ink horizontal, 6 digit consecutive numbering. Ballot Type, Language code, on front on the upper left, "VBM" on the left In Masthead "VBM"</p>

Attachment 1

ATTACHMENT A (continued)

<p>ROV Vote by Mail Ballot Packaging (VBM)</p>	<p>Pack by language combination Use largest print box labels as possible Paper bands of 50 for ROV English /Spanish. Other languages band in 25. Start a new box for each language Use paper stuffing only. No tape or strapping on boxes. Use box & lid #64 if 3 column ballot or #41 if 2 column ballot Ship to ROV</p>
<p>ROV TEST BALLOTS Finishing</p>	<p>No stub do NOT stitch at all. SCORE - No FOLD - No OVERPRINT - Yes TEST IMPRINTS RED ink horizontal,</p>
<p>ROV TEST Packaging</p>	<p>Pack by Ballot Type Use largest print box labels as possible Start a new box for each language Use paper stuffing only. No tape or strapping on boxes. Ship to ROV</p>
<p>Other Mailing House Requirements</p>	<p>No ACS/NCOA data file modifications Delivery to San Jose Lundy (95xxx zip codes) & San Francisco (94xxx zip codes) post offices</p>

Attachment 1

ATTACHMENT B

COUNTY: SANTA CLARA ELECT DATE: 5-3-11 JOB: 135801

SIZE: 6.72 X 9.25 + 1.25 = 6.72 X 10.5 OVERALL - 1 STUB

MAIL BALLOT FINISHING

SCORE YES SCORES FROM BOTTOM: 5.25
 FOLD YES FOLDS IN HALF WITH BALLOT FACE OUT
 OVERPRINT: NO TEST / DUPE FACTORY OPT / COLOR: _____
IMPRINTS
 IN STUB: LANGUAGE CODE, 2-DIGIT BT AND 6-DIGIT CONSECUTIVE NUMBER ON THE LEFT
 IN MASTHEAD: LANGUAGE CODE, 2-DIGIT BT
 NOTES: LANGUAGE CODES: E/S (Spanish), E/C (Chinese), E/V (Vietnamese), E/T (Tagalog).

MAIL BALLOT PACKING

PACKAGING: USE LABELS PROVIDED - PLEASE USE LARGEST PRINT LABELS POSSIBLE!!
 PACK: BY LANGUAGE
 PAPER BAND YES IN: UP TO 50'S DEPENDING ON ORDER QUANTITY
 SHRINK WRAP NO
 START NEW BOX FOR EACH: OK TO COMBINE E/C, E/V, AND E/T. MARK CARTONS CLEARLY.
 QTY PER BOX: 700 WEIGHT LIMIT (IF ANY) _____
 NOTES: Must use CO64 cartons. Use paper stuffing only. No tape or strapping on boxes.

SHIP TO:
 SANTA CLARA COUNTY
 REGISTRAR OF VOTERS
 1553 BERGER DR.
 SAN JOSE CA 95112
 ATTN: MIKE FONG OR MATT
 MORELES
 408-282-3063

SHIPPING INSTRUCTIONS:

DELIVER 8 A.M. TO 4:30 P.M. UNLESS
 CLEARED IN ADVANCE.

FOR WEEKEND DELIVERIES ONLY:
 CALL ALFRED GONZALES 408-282-
 3015 OR MIKE FONG 408-282-3058.

COORD: MARY CAY EXT: 320

Digital Press Runsheet
Santa Clara County, CA

135801
DRAFT 1

Group: Chinese
Paper Color: Lavender
Background/Color: Lavender CA Bear
Stripe Color: No Stripes
Text Color: Black

Balot Type Card

Group	Front Plate	Back Plate	ID Code	Quantity	Numbering From - To
01	43-001C-1SP87	X	MB	50	000001 000050
				01 Total	50
02	43-002C-1SP87	X	MB	260	000001 000260
				02 Total	260
03	43-003C-1SP87	X	MB	30	000001 000030
				03 Total	30
04	43-004C-1SP87	X	MB	50	000001 000050
				04 Total	50
Chinese				MB	390
				Total:	390

ATTACHMENT B (continued)

Registrar of Voters Procedures
Attachment 1
Balot Issuance Procedures

Attachment 1

ATTACHMENT C

MAIL

ES 02
654921

OFFICIAL BALLOT/BALOTA OFICIAL
SPECIAL ELECTION/ELECCIÓN ESPECIAL
SANTA CLARA COUNTY, MAY 3, 2011
CONDADO DE SANTA CLARA, 3 DE MAYO DE 2011
This numbered ballot stub shall be removed and retained by the voter.
El estorbo deberá desprender y guardar al tñon numerado de esta balota.

ES 02
**OFFICIAL BALLOT
BALOTA OFICIAL**
SPECIAL ELECTION
ELECCIÓN ESPECIAL
SANTA CLARA COUNTY/CONDADO DE SANTA CLARA
MAY 3, 2011 / 3 DE MAYO DE 2011

INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS: Complete the arrow next to your choice, using one thin line. Use only BLUE or BLACK ink to mark your ballot. If you make a mistake and need a new ballot, call the Registrar of Voters' Office for a replacement ballot.

INSTRUCCIONES PARA LOS VOTANTES: Complete la flecha junto a su elecci3n, utilizando una lnea delgada. Use únicamente tinta AZUL o NEGRA. Si comete un error y necesita una balota nueva, llame a la Oficina del Registrador de Votantes para una balota de reemplazo.

5.75" **SCORE FOLD**

**MEASURES SUBMITTED TO THE VOTERS
MEDIDAS SOMETIDAS A LOS VOTANTES**

**SCHOOL
ESCUELA**

**LOS GATOS-SARATOGA JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT
DISTRITO CONJUNTO DE ESCUELAS SECUNDARIAS UNIÓN
DE LOS GATOS-SARATOGA**

A To provide stable funding for local high schools, maintain outstanding core academic programs in math, science and English, attract highly qualified teachers, provide programs that prepare students for college and careers, and provide classroom materials like books and science kit equipment, shall the Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union High School District be authorized to levy \$40 per parcel annually for six years, with certain oversight, an exemption for seniors, no funds for administrative salaries, and every dollar staying in local high schools?

A fin de proporcionar financiamiento estable para las escuelas secundarias locales, mantener programas académicos sobresalientes en matemáticas, ciencias e inglés, atraer a maestros altamente calificados, proporcionar programas que preparen a los estudiantes para la universidad y los careers, y proporcionar materiales para las aulas como libros y equipo de ciencias para los laboratorios, ¿debe autorizarse al Distrito Conjunto de Escuelas Secundarias Unión de Los Gatos-Saratoga a gravar \$40 por parcela anualmente durante seis años, con supervisión ciudadana, con una exención para personas de la tercera edad, sin fondos para salarios de administradores, y que cada dólar permanezca en las escuelas secundarias locales?

YES / SI
NO / NO

43-0015-13967

BT 1 ES

6.72"

E-MAILED 11:20 AM

6.72 x 10.5 OVERALL

Attachment 1

ATTACHMENT D

VOTE BY MAIL DATA PROCESSING CHECKLIST		COUNTY: SANTA CLARA COUNTY, JOB: 15712		ELECTION DATE: NOV 2, 2010 GENERAL		
ORIGINAL FILES		No. of records	Date Received			
EB3 MB PSI C V T 11 2 10.txt		2,311	09/13/10			
EB3 MB PSI E - 5 11 2 10.txt		40,961	09/13/10			
EB3 PERM PSI C V T 11 2 10.txt		30,707	09/13/10			
EB3 PERM PSI E 5 11 2 10.txt		442,981	09/13/10			
TOTAL NO. OF RECORDS RECEIVED		525,980				
DATA PROCESSING		COMPLETED (Y/N)	DATE			
Address Correction and Parsing						
Standardize addresses with CASS-certified software		Y	09/15/10			
Software identifies San Francisco SCF records		Y	09/15/10			
Presort with PAVE-certified presort software		Y	09/15/10			
Create Excel spreadsheet of unqualified and international records		Y	09/15/10			
Move Update Method						
Ancillary Service Endorsement (DEFAULT for Vote By Mail Ballots)		Y	09/15/10			
FAS7forward (DEFAULT IS NO unless directed otherwise in writing by county)		N	09/15/10			
NCOALink (DEFAULT IS NO unless directed otherwise in writing by county)		N	09/15/10			
ACS (DEFAULT IS NO unless directed otherwise in writing by county)		N	09/15/10			
Multiple (DEFAULT IS NO unless directed otherwise in writing by county)		N	09/15/10			
Append RMB information to all mailing records						
Sampling Tracking (track statistical sampling of records)		N	09/15/10			
Unique Tracking (every individual record is being tracked)		Y	09/15/10			
Append Version ID						
Segment/Version ID variables include:		Y	09/15/10			
Mail Class		Y	09/15/10			
Post Office of Mailing		Y	09/15/10			
MB/VBM		Y	09/15/10			
Language		Y	09/15/10			
No. of cards		Y	09/15/10			
Ballot Type		Y	09/15/10			
Party		N	09/15/10			
Match Codes						
Populate Inker code (i, code) field with 8 digit serial number		Y	09/15/10			
Populate ballot card field(s) with match codes		Y	09/15/10			
No. of ballot card fields		Y	09/15/10			
NOTE: The serial no. in the II Code must match the serial no. in the Match Code						
Send to ProVote and to County						
Master database with Version ID, II Code, and Ballot Card fields		Y	09/15/10			
Version Matrix to include Version ID, match code range, and counts for each version		Y	09/15/10			
Excel spreadsheet of unqualified and international records		Y	09/15/10			
This checklist of steps taken, to be reviewed and approved by the County		Y	09/15/10			
ACCOUNTING OF TOTAL RECORDS		NO. OF RECORDS	DATE			
Total records to be mailed by Postal Systems		525,942	09/15/11			
International records returned to the County		17	09/15/11			
Undeliverable records returned to the County		21	09/15/11			
TOTAL NO. OF RECORDS (must match total no. of records in original files)		525,980				
ACCOUNTING OF MAIL RECORDS		FC STAMPS	FC INDICA	NP INDICA	TOTAL	DATE
SAN JOSE POST OFFICE		157	233	419,068	419,518	09/15/10
SAN FRANCISCO POST OFFICE		138	269	106,017	106,424	09/18/10
TOTAL NO. OF RECORDS MAILED BY POSTAL SYSTEMS		335	572	525,085	525,942	
PREPARED BY		APPROVED BY				
NAME:	SAMPLE		NAME:	SAMPLE		
SIGNATURE:	SAMPLE		SIGNATURE:	SAMPLE		
TITLE:	SAMPLE		TITLE:	SAMPLE		
DATE:	SAMPLE		DATE:	SAMPLE		
COMPANY:	SAMPLE		COUNTY:	SAMPLE		

Attachment 1

ATTACHMENT E

**Check List of Items that must be printed
On the Return Absentee Envelope**

Vendor _____

Sample supplied date _____

Data File items that must be printed on the AV Return Envelope	√
Name	
Mailing Address	
City, State, Zip	
Post office barcode	
Absentee ID number (printed)	
Absentee ID number (3 of 9 barcode)	
Affidavit number	
Voting Precinct Number	
Language	
Political party (Primary only)	
Ballot Type	
Election Date	
Run date	
Perm AV code, or Mail Ballot Code (type)	
Check sample to see if 3 of 9 barcode works	
Check to see if name and address shows through the opening in the window envelope	
Sample attached	

Checked by _____

Date _____

sl

1/13/06 1/30/2006 5:14 PM PSI Checkoff list for vbm envelope
 9/29/2006 C:\Users\vmatt.moreles SCCGOV.000\Desktop\PSI Checkoff list for vbm envelope.doc

Attachment 1

OPTICAL SCAN QUALITY CONTROL

Background

Elections Code §13000 states, "The person in charge of elections for any county...shall provide ballots for any elections within his or her jurisdiction, and shall cause to be printed on them the name of every candidate...entitled to a place on the...ballot." In Elections Code §13002 it states, "Ballot paper and ballot cards used by a jurisdiction...shall be tinted and watermarked or overprinted with a design, to be furnished by the Secretary of State, ...that...is plainly discernible." In Elections Code §13004 (a) it states, "The Secretary of State shall adopt regulations governing the manufacture, finishing, quality standards, distribution, and inventory control of ballot cards and requiring the biennial inspection of the manufacturing, finishing, and storage facilities involving ballot cards. The Secretary of State shall also approve each ballot card manufacturer or finisher prior to...providing ballot cards for use in California elections." Also, Elections Code §13005 (a) states, "Before a user may purchase ballot cards, the user shall request a release for a specific quantity of these ballot cards from the Secretary of State."

These laws, guidelines, and standards serve to inform us as to the proper procedures and best practices to apply in procuring Ballots from manufacturers for use in elections.

O. S. BALLOT QUALITY CONTROL PROCESSING

Overview

County elections officials must provide ballots for any elections within their jurisdiction and ensure that proper procedures are in place to comply with law in their design, manufacture, quality, distribution, and inventory. Optical Scan Ballots received from a printer or finisher for use in any election must comply with elections code law and the regulations set forth by the Secretary of State. While overall compliance with this mandate encompasses many separate division responsibilities covered by other ROV procedures; it is Optical Scan Quality Control processing which is one of the tangible procedural activities that ensures ballot conformity. This activity is undertaken to confirm that which has been attested to in the Manufacturer's Quality Control Assurance Letter sent to VBM management prior to shipment. Tests are conducted by VBM personnel following established guidelines on a sample of the Ballots when they arrive in-house; and after the Quality Control processing & procedures have been completed with good results. The Printing vendor will do an extensive quality control process prior to the ballots leaving the plant. A letter of Assurance will be provided as well as a completed "Ballot Inspection Checklist" with each ballot shipment. (See attached flowchart).

Attachment 1

Scope

This procedure will pertain to Optical Scan Ballots that are procured from approved outside vendors such as Provot Solutions, Inc. for use in lawfully called county, special, and statewide elections where 400C Tabulating Machine will be utilized for automated vote counting. This procedure will not pertain to Quality Control inspection or testing for any other election materials or voting systems used in conjunction with this or other elections.

Requirements and Preparation

1. Inspection Team(s) of 3 people (1 recorder, 1 person operating the "Go/No-Go" Gauge, and 1 person opening the boxes).
2. Space to store the ballots on pallets.
3. A place to store the ballots after the quality control process is completed.
4. Tables to do the actual quality control testing.
5. Packing List from the Manufacturer.
6. Optical Scan Ballots.
7. Rubber Bands.
8. Go/No-Go Gauges.
9. Box cutters to open up the packing cartons containing the ballots.
10. Red & Black ink pens.
11. A list of plate codes, provided by Ballot Layout Division. The plate code list is an election specific BPS generated list which is a cross reference to each page front and back by ballot type, language, and page.
12. A Quality Control Sheet that lists all of the languages, parties, ballot types, sequence numbers of ballots ordered with spaces to log and make comments.

Employee Guidelines for Quality Control Process

1. Employees must have clean hands.
2. Ensure a clean working area to perform the work.
3. No food or drinks are allowed in the "quality control" work area.
4. Only one packaging carton containing Optical Scan ballots is to be opened at a time per Inspection Team.
5. Employees are encouraged to ask questions, collaborate with other team members, and make notes about observations as they proceed.
6. If you think you have found a problem or an inconsistency with the ballot(s), at any point in the inspection process notify your supervisor immediately.

Procedures and Processing

I. Verification of Box Label to Content (This applies to every box):

1. Verify that the number sequence on the box label matches or falls within the ballot number sequence.
2. Open the box and verify that the ballots in the box match the party, ballot type, and language indicated on the box label.

Attachment 1

3. Verify that the serial numbers of the first and last number in the ballot box match the label.
4. Verify that the quantity of ballots in the box matches the number listed on the label.
5. Verify that you see black trim marks along the sides of all the bundles in the box (Do not remove the bundles to do this check).

II. Ballot Inspection.

Inspect a minimum of 3 ballot cards per ballot type and 3 ballot cards in each box of multi-boxed ballot types.

A. Small Ballot Types in One Box or Less:

1. Check 3 ballots (beginning, middle, and end) in the last bundle (Note: this is where production begins). The number of ballot to inspect depends on the quantity ordered for each ballot type.
2. If the ballot type is larger than one bundle, check at least 2 more ballots for that ballot type, from different bundles. Check a minimum of 3 ballots per ballot type.
3. Break the paper band around the ballot bundle where you are going to take inspection samples from and replace it with a rubber band.
4. Place the ballot in front of you to check the front & back plate codes (on the bottom of the ballot) against the Run Sheet.
5. If all the numbers are correct on the ballot inspected, initial and date that line of the Run Sheet (see example below).
6. If the numbers are not correct, alert your supervisor immediately of the discrepancy.
7. Follow items C. through E. below to complete inspection of ballot.

Example of Quality Control Sheet:

Party	Ballot Type	Number Sequence	Serial Numbers Checked	Comments
DEM	1	1-50	1 750 1500	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good • Torn or soiled • Printing problem (wrong plates, splotches bad registration, no trim marks visible) • Serial number (i.e. repeated or skipped, partially inked or crooked; missing digits) • Size (i.e. too wide, too narrow) • Folding problem (i.e. Crooked, touches arrows) • Banding problem (i.e. Sloppy or "popping open")

Attachment 1

B. Large Ballot Type in More than One Box:

1. Start with the last box, the one containing the highest number sequence ballots.
2. Check 3 ballots (beginning, middle, and end) in the last bundle (Note: this is where production begins).
3. Check 1 ballot from the beginning of that box.
4. Check 1 ballot from the middle of that box.
5. Work successively through each lower numbered box, checking one ballot from each box.
 - a. Break the paper band around the bundle you are inspecting and replace it with a rubber band.
 - b. Check the front & back plate codes (on the bottom of the ballot) against the Run Sheet.
 - c. If all the numbers are correct on the ballot inspected, initial and date that line of the Run Sheet. (Place a tick mark on each data element to stay on track).
 - d. If the numbers are not correct, alert your supervisor immediately.
6. Follow items C. through E. below to complete inspection of ballot.

C. Go/No-Go Gauging (Checking for Ballot Size):

1. Insert the foot (the bottom) of the ballot through the green side of the Go/No-Go Gauge to check for proper ballot size (width).
2. If it slides through, the ballot width is Good.
3. Try to insert the foot (the bottom) of the ballot into the red side of the Gauge.
4. The ballot should not go through.
5. If the ballot goes through the green and will not go through the red side of the Go/No-Go Gauge it is a good ballot (neither too wide nor too narrow).
6. If the ballot will not go through the green side or it will go through the red side of the Go/No-Go Gauge-you must reject the ballot (a rejected ballot) for being out of size tolerances (too wide, too narrow).

D. Printing Quality and Format:

1. Check the scoring; folding on the front and back, verifying that no smudge, fold, or score path is within any voting target arrows.
2. Check the print quality on the front and back of the ballot – making sure there are no hickeys or stray ink spots in the header codes, or ink spots in voting target areas.
3. Inspect ballots for visible toner rub-off, smudges, stain, wrinkles, stray ink spots, etc. Rub two ballots together with some pressure to check for toner quality. If the ink smudges or smears, notify the supervisor.
4. Check the ballots for format:
 - a. Check the trim marks on the right and left edges of the ballots. Make sure there are some black non-continuous lines along the sides of the ballot.
 - b. Check the Write-In spaces (for contests with candidates) and make sure there are arrows for voting.
 - c. Check the front to back registration of the ballot using the square boxes at the top right and lower left corners of the ballot.

Attachment 1

5. Place a rubber band around the ballots and replace the bundle in the same place it came in the box.
6. Once the ballots are checked, complete the "Ballot Quality Control Sheet" and write any comments if an issue is identified.
7. If a ballot is rejected, write the serial number of the rejected ballot on the outside of the box. Place the rejected ballot into the "Problem Tray" and notify the Supervisor.

E. When you have Completed Checking the Ballots in the Box:

1. Place a big Red check mark and your initials on the lower right-hand corner of the box.
2. Place the box back on the pallet or on a shelf as directed by the supervisor.

F. Transporting & Storing the Ballots:

1. The supervisor will determine the quantity of ballots to be sent to the secure Vote by Mail Ballot Room. The overflow will be placed on shelves in the warehouse behind the security fence.
2. Ballots must be transported from the warehouse to the office with at least 2 people.
3. All ballot storage area must either be locked or there must be at least 2 Registrar of Voters VBM staff present at all times.


G. Additional In-house Testing Performed:

In addition to the above procedures, Vote by Mail staff performs additional in-house testing of ballots.

1. IS performs Logic & Accuracy testing with premarked test ballots printed by Printing Services and will integrated pre-mark ProVote ballots to ensure counting accuracy.
2. Prior to the election, test ballots samples are sent to ourselves through the mail, and using the return envelopes mailed back to the ROV; then, VBM personnel run the ballots through the 400C Tabulating machine to see if any votes are counted and report the result to the supervisor.
3. Also, Vote by Mail staff conduct inspections of returned ballots when we start to open them beginning on the seventh business day prior to the election.

Attachment 1

Optical Scan QC Flowchart



PSI DATA FILE HANDLING PROCEDURE

Document No.	
Effective Date	7/5/11
Revision Date	
Revision No.	
Page No.	1 of 1

Author	Mary Cay Albert
Approved By	Brian Lierman
Reviewed By	Brian Lierman

1.0 Purpose

To make sure all Election mailing files are processed according to Customer requirements and Election Code.

2.0 Revision History

Date	Rev. No.	Change	Reference Section(s)
7/5/11	1	New Procedure Drafted	N/A

3.0 Scope

ProVoteSolutions – Customer Service, Mailing, Quality Control

4.0 Definitions

Gather requirements from Customer, record what processes were done to mailing file, and proof those processes back to customer to verify the requirements requested were performed.

5.0 References

Election Code book
List of customer requirements
Description of Election Checklist from PSI

6.0 Procedures

- 6.1 Election Coordinator to receive list of processes to be performed to mailing files by customer.
- 6.2 Election Coordinator to pass this information on to PSI along with mailing files received from Customer.
- 6.3 PSI to record on the "VOTE BY MAIL DATA PROCESSING CHECKLIST" quantities or yes/no (whichever is required), sign and date at the bottom, and send as a PDF file to the Election Coordinator with the POD File Matrix and processed mailing files.
- 6.4 Election Coordinator to make sure any and all processes required were performed and forward the "VOTE BY MAIL DATA PROCESSING CHECKLIST" to the Customer for their approval, along with the POD File Matrix.
- 6.5 Customer to verify that all processes were performed that were requested, and none that weren't, sign their approval and return to Election Coordinator.
- 6.6 No production, ballot printing, or addressing will begin until signed off checklist is received back from Customer.

7.0 Attachments

VOTE BY MAIL DATA PROCESSING CHECKLIST

POD File Matrix - Sample

ORIGINAL FILES	No. of records	Date Received
TOTAL NO. OF RECORDS RECEIVED		

DATA PROCESSING	COMPLETED (Y/N)	DATE
Address Correction and Parsing		
Standardize addresses with CASS-certified software		
Software identifies San Francisco SCF records		
Presort with PAVE-certified presort software		
Create Excel spreadsheet of unqualified and international records		
Move Update Method		
Ancillary Service Endorsement (DEFAULT for Vote By Mail Ballots)		
FASTforward (DEFAULT IS NO unless directed otherwise in writing by county)		
NCOALink (DEFAULT IS NO unless directed otherwise in writing by county)		
ACS (DEFAULT IS NO unless directed otherwise in writing by county)		
Multiple (DEFAULT IS NO unless directed otherwise in writing by county)		
Append IMB information to all mailing records		
Sampling Tracking (track statistical sampling of records)		
Unique Tracking (every individual record is being tracked)		
Append Version ID		
Segment/Version ID variables include:		
Mail Class		
Post Office of Mailing		
MB/VBM		
Language		
No. of cards		
Ballot Type		
Party		
Match Codes		
Populate Inkjet code (ij_code) field with 6 digit serial number		
Populate ballot card field(s) with match codes		
No. of ballot card fields		
NOTE: The serial no. in the U Code must match the serial no. in the Match Code		
Send to ProVote and to County		
Master database with Version ID, U Code, and Ballot Card fields		
Version Matrix to include Version ID, match code range, and counts for each version		
Excel spreadsheet of unqualified and international records		
This checklist of steps taken, to be reviewed and approved by the County		

ACCOUNTING OF TOTAL RECORDS	NO. OF RECORDS	DATE
Total records to be mailed by Postal Systems		
International records returned to the County		
Undeliverable records returned to the County		
TOTAL NO. OF RECORDS (must match total no. of records in original files)		

ACCOUNTING OF MAIL RECORDS	FC STAMPS	FC INDICIA	NP INDICA	TOTAL	DATE
SAN JOSE POST OFFICE					
SAN FRANCISCO POST OFFICE					
TOTAL NO. OF RECORDS MAILED BY POSTAL SYSTEMS					

PREPARED BY

NAME: _____

SIGNATURE: _____

TITLE: _____

DATE: _____

COMPANY: _____

APPROVED BY

NAME: _____

SIGNATURE: _____

TITLE: _____

DATE: _____

COUNTY: _____

ORIGINAL FILES	No. of records	Date Received
E83 MB PSI C V T 11 2 10.txt	2,331	09/13/10
E83 MB PSI E - S 11 2 10.txt	40,961	09/13/10
E83 PERM PSI C V T 11 2 10.txt	39,707	09/13/10
E83 PERM PSI E S 11 2 10.txt	442,981	09/13/10
TOTAL NO. OF RECORDS RECEIVED	525,980	

DATA PROCESSING	COMPLETED (Y/N)	DATE
Address Correction and Parsing		
Standardize addresses with CASS-certified software	Y	09/15/10
Software identifies San Francisco SCF records	Y	09/15/10
Presort with PAVE-certified presort software	Y	09/15/10
Create Excel spreadsheet of unqualified and international records	Y	09/15/10
Move Update Method		
Ancillary Service Endorsement (DEFAULT for Vote By Mail Ballots)	Y	09/15/10
FASTforward (DEFAULT IS NO unless directed otherwise in writing by county)	N	09/15/10
NCOALink (DEFAULT IS NO unless directed otherwise in writing by county)	N	09/15/10
ACS (DEFAULT IS NO unless directed otherwise in writing by county)	N	09/15/10
Multiple (DEFAULT IS NO unless directed otherwise in writing by county)	N	09/15/10
Append IMB information to all mailing records		
Sampling Tracking (track statistical sampling of records)	N	09/15/10
Unique Tracking (every individual record is being tracked)	Y	09/15/10
Append Version ID		
Segment/Version ID variables include:	Y	09/15/10
Mail Class	Y	09/15/10
Post Office of Mailing	Y	09/15/10
MB/VBM	Y	09/15/10
Language	Y	09/15/10
No. of cards	Y	09/15/10
Ballot Type	Y	09/15/10
Party	N	09/15/10
Match Codes		
Populate inkjet code (ij_code) field with 6 digit serial number	Y	09/15/10
Populate ballot card field(s) with match codes	Y	09/15/10
No. of ballot card fields	Y	09/15/10
NOTE: The serial no. in the U Code must match the serial no. in the Match Code		
Send to ProVote and to County		
Master database with Version ID, II Code, and Ballot Card fields	Y	09/15/10
Version Matrix to include Version ID, match code range, and counts for each version	Y	09/15/10
Excel spreadsheet of unqualified and international records	Y	09/15/10
This checklist of steps taken, to be reviewed and approved by the County	Y	09/15/10

ACCOUNTING OF TOTAL RECORDS	NO. OF RECORDS	DATE
Total records to be mailed by Postal Systems	525,942	09/15/11
International records returned to the County	17	09/15/11
Undeliverable records returned to the County	21	09/15/11
TOTAL NO. OF RECORDS (must match total no. of records in original files)	525,980	

ACCOUNTING OF MAIL RECORDS	FC STAMPS	FC INDICIA	NP INDICA	TOTAL	DATE
SAN JOSE POST OFFICE	197	253	419,068	419,518	09/15/10
SAN FRANCISCO POST OFFICE	138	269	106,017	106,424	09/16/10
TOTAL NO. OF RECORDS MAILED BY POSTAL SYSTEMS	335	522	525,085	525,942	

PREPARED BY

NAME: _____

SIGNATURE: _____

TITLE: _____

DATE: _____

COMPANY: _____

APPROVED BY

NAME: _____

SIGNATURE: _____

TITLE: _____

DATE: _____

COUNTY: _____

County of Santa Clara **Attachment 3**
Registrar of Voters



1355 Berger Drive, Building 2
San Jose, California 95112
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 611380, San Jose, CA 95161-1360
(408) 299-VOTE (8683) (866) 430-VOTE (8683) FAX (408) 998-7314
www.sccvote.org

<Date>

Dear Vote by Mail Voter:

Earlier this month, the Registrar of Voters' Office mailed you a ballot for the **<Election Date> Election**. However, it has now come to our attention that you received the incorrect ballot type.

To ensure that you have an opportunity to vote on all the candidates and measures for which you are eligible, please find enclosed a new ballot.

Please complete and return this new ballot as soon as possible. Ballots must be received by the Registrar of Voters' Office no later than 8:00 pm on **<Election Date>**.

Please disregard any previous ballot you may have received. Any previous ballot that you received is now void. Please destroy it and vote the new ballot instead. If you have already returned your old ballot, it will be voided and cannot be counted. You must complete the new ballot that is enclosed with this letter.

I apologize for any inconvenience this may cause. If you have questions, please contact the Registrar of Voters' Office at **(408) 299-VOTE [8683]** or toll-free at **(866) 430-VOTE [8683]**.

Sincerely,

Elaine Larson
Assistant Registrar of Voters



POLITICS > ELECTION

Denver election vendor: ballot due date error “not acceptable”



By **THE DENVER POST** | newsroom@denverpost.com
April 16, 2015 at 12:52 p.m.

The inside flap of a ballot return envelope for the May 5 election was printed mistakenly with the date of the potential June 2 run-off election due to a vendor's error, the Denver Elections Division says. (Submitted photo)

As we've reported [here](#) and [here](#), the mass-mailing of ballots this week by the Denver Elections Division was clouded by a due-date printing error on the inside flap of many returned envelopes.

Election officials have blamed a vendor, ProVote Solutions, and that company's envelope-printing subcontractor, Cenvéo, for the error. The envelope flaps say ballots must be returned by 7 p.m. June 2 — the date of a potential run-off — instead of by that time on May 5, the actual election. Other materials, including the ballot itself, list the correct election date. It's unclear how many voters received packets containing return envelopes with the wrong due date.

On Thursday, ProVote Solutions vice president Cris Highnote sent this statement,



As you are aware some envelopes were printed with the incorrect return date by the envelope manufacturer Cenvéo which was an envelope subcontractor for ProVoteSolutions. We truly regret this and are holding Cenvéo fully responsible for their mistake.

"Both ProVote and Cenvéo have been providing Denver County with Election Ballots and Envelopes for at least the last 8 years with no serious issues in the past. However, we fully understand that the Election voting processes must be trusted by all voters and any error which might degrade that trust is not acceptable.



No More Free Returns? Amazon Releases New Fees

Americans, you'll want to check this out ASAP

Online Shopping Tools | Sponsored

'Nature's Liquid Energy' Is Now Legal In Kansas

(Order online while you can)

Health Headlines | Sponsored

Try Now

Here's What A Walk-In Shower Should Cost

Luxury Walk-In Showers Are Now More Affordable Than Ever

MadCity Showers | Sponsored

Learn More

Here Are 23 Of The Coolest Gifts For 2023

23 Hottest Cool Gifts In 2023 You'll Regret Not Getting Before They Sell Out

Best Tech Trend | Sponsored

Puppy Refuses To Leave Railway Police Bursts Into Tears When They Discover Why

Learn It Wise | Sponsored

START NOW

2 Easy
1. Clk
2. Ad

https://www.theunion.com/news/local-news/nevada-county-vote-by-mail-ballots-delayed-due-to-printer-error/article_b50d05eb-4537-593c-8de7-60f826bc8eb8.html

Nevada County vote-by-mail ballots delayed due to printer error

By NCS Import
May 8, 2014

A printer error means Nevada County residents who signed up to vote by mail will have to wait until next week to receive their ballots, county elections staff said late Wednesday.

Sandy Sjoberg, Nevada County Assistant Clerk Recorder, said the county's ballot printer had to scrap the first run of Nevada County's vote-by-mail ballots — as well as the polling place ballots — after an error was discovered late Tuesday.

Vote-by-mail ballots had been scheduled to go out to voters starting Wednesday.

A second run of ballots will be sent out instead starting Monday.

“Although the ballot mailing will be delayed, it still meets the timeline designated by the California Elections Code,” Sjoberg said.

The county's printer is absorbing all costs for the re-run, she added.

The statewide primary elections are June 3.

“It would have caused great confusion,” Sjoberg said of the error, which she described as “burgundy-red-purple colored markings” appearing at random locations on the ballots. “It was not acceptable.”

Sjoberg said elections office staff noticed the error Tuesday afternoon in a batch of overrun ballots sent to the elections office for use in the event of a need for extra ballots.

Staff members contacted the printer, who ran a check on the other ballots and noticed the same error throughout.

The printer, whom Sjoberg declined to identify, told Sjoberg that the ballots would be reprinted at no extra cost to the county and ready for distribution by Monday, May 12.

“In order to ensure Nevada County has a trouble-free election, we determined our best course of action is to reprint all ballots and associated material for the mailing packets and reprocess them at our expense,” said the printer in a statement sent out Wednesday afternoon by Sjoberg.

According to county sources close to the issue, the printer is Porterville-based ProVote Solutions.



According to the unattributed statement by the printer in Wednesday's news release, the cause of the Nevada County error has been corrected.

"Our paramount concern is and always has been that our customers are provided with the best quality ballots for error-free voting and tabulating," the printer said.

Sjoberg said any voters who need a ballot prior to May 16 can obtain one at the Nevada County Elections Office at the Eric Rood Center in Nevada City. Electronic voting is also possible at the Truckee Town Hall, she said.

To contact Staff Writer Keri Brenner, email kbrenner@theunion.com or call 530-477-4239.

https://hanfordsentinel.com/news/local/officials-ballot-mix-up-didn-t-affect-outcomes/article_94611ae5-60a4-53f0-84fe-2c438b6f3a11.html

Officials: Ballot mix-up didn't affect outcomes

By Mike Eiman Staff Reporter
Jun 9, 2016



Kings County Sheriff David Robinson thanks supporters for coming out for the election results gathering in Lemoore on Tuesday evening.

Gary Feinstein/The Sentinel

A printing error that caused some Kings County voters to get the wrong ballot does not appear to have affected the outcome of any races.

Kristine Lee, Kings County registrar of voters, said seven polling locations in District 4 for the Kings County Republican Central Committee had two different ballot types. The error caused some voters to get a ballot listing candidates from District 3.

The elections office learned about the error Tuesday morning and rushed to supply the affected locations with the correct ballots. Lee said mail-in ballots and ballots that were available at the elections office on Tuesday were all printed correctly.

“It’s really a strange thing that it was only at the polling places,” Lee said.

Elections office employees identified 52 of the faulty ballots and transferred them to the correct form for counting, Lee said. The counting of those ballots excluded the central committee race, unless voters wrote in the correct candidates from their district.

According to the semi-official final election results, 52 votes would not have changed the outcome of the District 4 race, which included four seats on the committee. The fifth highest vote-getter fell about 161 votes short.

Lee said she and her staff had not had time as of Wednesday to fully investigate what caused the error. She said the county used the same state certified printing company, the Porterville-based ProVote Solutions, for the voter booklet and the ballots.

Tuesday's mix-up marks the third printing issue the Kings County Election's Office has experienced in the past couple months. An error in the sample ballot and voter information booklet sent to voters omitted the argument in favor of Measure K.

The elections office sent out a correction with the argument included.

Lee said waiting times to have the ballots printed kept mail-in ballots from being sent out until two weeks before the election. She said she will be looking at other certified printing companies to supply materials for future elections.

The errors led to a number of rumors about other ballot defects.

Kings County Sheriff Dave Robinson said he heard unverified reports on Tuesday that some ballots excluded Measure K, a quarter-cent sales tax increase that would support local police and fire departments. Robinson said elections officials have assured him that the measure was not affected.

As of Wednesday, Measure K had 66.4 percent voter approval, just 40 votes shy of the two-thirds threshold needed to pass.

"For the moment, I'm curious to see what the full problem was and whether Measure K was affected," Robinson said.

Hanford Mayor Justin Mendes, who was among the top four candidates in the District 4 central committee race, said he heard an unconfirmed report of at least one ballot at the Martin Luther King Elementary School precinct that was blank on the back side. That would have excluded the Republican Central Committee and Measure K.

Lee told The Sentinel that Measure K was a countywide initiative and appeared on all Kings County ballots, including the misprinted ballots in District 4. She said the election office's counting machines check for every item that's supposed to be on the ballot. Any error or omission would have been caught.

Lee said the committee in support of Measure K could request a recount, at its own expense, if its members feel there was an error in the counting process.

As of Wednesday morning, there were still 657 provisional ballots remaining to be counted and an unknown number of mail-in ballots that could trail in before the end of the week.

Robinson, himself an elected official who is familiar with election processes, said he believes it's unlikely the uncounted ballots will change the outcome.

"I would be really surprised if we're able to overcome that 40-vote deficit," Robinson said. "My bigger concern is that you've got 66 percent of the public who thought this was a good idea, but the threshold is so high."

According to the California Secretary of State's Office, all vote-by-mail ballots that were postmarked by Tuesday must be received by Friday to be counted. The county has to report the final certified results by July 8.

The reporter can be reached at 583-2458 or meiman@HanfordSentinel.com. Follow him on Twitter @MikeE_HS.

Election coverage

All your election news is here: <http://hanfordsentinel.com/election2016/>

A national feed provides up-to-the-minute information on the presidential campaigns. Local election stories are collected on the page.



Ooops: 115,000 People Sent to One Polling Spot

By Lori Preuitt • Published October 12, 2011 • Updated on October 13, 2011 at 8:31 am

A printing error caused the [San Francisco Department of Elections](#) to send out the wrong polling place address to 115,000 people.

It would be mad house to say the least if they all showed up where instructed. All 115,000 were told to go to 31 Howth St, near [City College of San Francisco](#).

To fix the error, the election department is going to send out three correction mailers.

Elections director [John Arntz](#) told BCN the error was discovered late last week and was caused by vendor who printed the fliers [Provote Solutions](#).

It wasn't clear who would pay the bill for the correction notices.

You can look up your polling place [at this website](#) or call (415) 554-4375.

The Nov. 8 election in the City will decide the city's new mayor, district attorney and sheriff, as well as several propositions concerning pensions for city workers and bonds for the city's schools and roads.

Bay City News contributed to this report.

Printing error leads to ballot mistake in Sonoma County

BRETT WILKISON
THE PRESS DEMOCRAT
May 17, 2010



A printing error on absentee ballots sent out last week to Democratic voters in southern Sonoma County means that more than 15,000 voters will receive a second, corrected ballot this week.

The Mark West Union School District Measure C — a ballot measure meant for voters in the Santa Rosa and Larkfield areas — was included on absentee ballots sent to Democratic voters in the Petaluma and south county area, Sonoma County elections officials said Monday.

The mistake was traced back to an error by the county's printer, Porterville-based ProVote Solutions, Colter said.

It affected an unknown number of absentee ballots, she said. But county officials made the decision to send corrected ballots to the entire affected voting block, approximately 15,600 voters, Colter said.

The actual number of ballots affected by the error could be much smaller, she said.

ADVERTISEMENT

 **Start the conversation**

Have your say.

Leave a comment below and let us know what you think.

The corrected ballots should arrive via first class mail this week, Colter said.

ballot.

If a voter is unable to return the corrected ballot, their original ballot will be unvoided and their votes transferred to a duplicate, corrected ballot, Colter said.

Absentee ballots sent to other areas of the county were not affected by the error, she said.

"This was a very rare occurrence," she said. The printer "is doing everything they can to investigate the cause."

The county has contracted with the printer, formerly Sequoia Voting Systems for decades. ProVote Solutions took over the company's printing division last year.

The cost of printing and mailing the corrected ballots will be paid by ProVote Solutions, officials said. ProVote Solutions could not be reached for comment.

Elections officials also said Monday that they had received a number of phone calls from absentee voters saying that their ballot packets were received open.

Officials said the cause was thicker ballots — including voter information pamphlets — which got caught in the the Post Office's processing equipment.

Voters who receive an open ballot packet should confirm that it contains all contents, including a voter information pamphlet, a ballot contained in a blue secrecy envelope, an identification envelope that requires the voter's signature and a return envelope.

EVENING REPORT NEWSLETTER

4:30 PM WEEKDAYS

News you may have missed today.

Enter your email address

Opt out anytime. [Read our Privacy Policy](#)

Quarter of city's voter pamphlets sent out with wrong info

By ABC7

Wednesday, October 12, 2011

SAN FRANCISCO

About 115,000 pamphlets sent out to voters have a single polling place near City College of San Francisco -- 31 Howth St. -- as the location they should go to vote on Nov. 8.

San Francisco had 461,983 registered voters as of Oct. 1, but only voters who live in the area of Geneva Avenue and Howth Street should vote at that polling place on Election Day.

That means the department will have to send three correction notices to each of the residents who received the faulty information, director John Arntz said.

Today was the deadline for when the Department of Elections had to send out the voter information pamphlets.

Arntz said the department discovered the problem on Friday night and were able to stop an additional 18,000 pamphlets that had the wrong polling place address from being sent out.

The error was apparently caused by ProVote Solutions, the city's vendor who printed the ballots.

The city is consolidating precincts for the election, and "when the vendor went to print the polling place, for some reason the information it drew was the same polling place" of 31 Howth St., Arntz said.

The website for ProVote Solutions, based in Porterville in the Central Valley, says the company prints election materials for 42 counties in five states and has been certified by California as an election printer for the past six years.

Arntz said, "I'm not expecting for the city to have to pay" for the cost of sending out the corrections, saying he will discuss the issue with the vendor.

The correction notices will be sent out on a letter-sized postcard with each voter's correct polling place address, Arntz said. The first notice will be sent this week, another will be sent in two weeks, and the last one will be sent the week before the election.

Arntz said voters unsure of where to vote can use the polling place lookup module on the department's website at <http://gispubweb.sfgov.org/website/pollingplace>.

Anyone with questions about the election can also call the department at (415) 554-4375.

The Nov. 8 election will decide the city's new mayor, district attorney and sheriff, as well as several propositions concerning pensions for city workers and bonds for the city's schools and roads.

Copyright © 2023 KABC Television, LLC. All rights reserved.

TOP STORIES



Third striker, his daughter arrested in stabbing death of OC man
Updated 36 minutes ago



Cindy Montanez, former San Fernando councilwoman, dies



CA Airbnb host faces \$300K in damages after guests flood home
Updated 2 hours ago

OC man arrested for alleged sexual assault of underage girl

Ex-MLB pitcher, woman arrested in connection to 2021 murder: police

Convicted child molester sets up 'free fentanyl' sign across CA school

Family seeks help finding missing teen last seen at school in Westlake

[SHOW MORE](#)

Get 93% off your first month. Subscribe today for \$1.

GET ACCESS



LOG IN

SUBSCRIBE NOW



THE TRIBUNE

Part of the McClatchy Media Network

Local News Opinion Food & Drink Sports The Cambrian • Education Weather California Obituaries Personal F

LOCAL

Thousands of SLO County voters receive 2 ballots weeks before Election Day

BY MONICA VAUGHAN AND KATHE TANNER

UPDATED FEBRUARY 14, 2020 4:46 PM



Get 93% off your first month. Subscribe today for \$1.

San Luis Obispo County Clerk-Recorder Tommy Gong talks about the process of counting ballots on June 6, 2018, the day after the California Primary. Thousands of ballots remain after Election Day in SLO County. BY MONICA VAUGHAN



Only have a minute? Listen instead

1.0M

Powered by **Trinity Audio**

00:00

03:38

Update 4:40 p.m.

San Luis Obispo County elections official Tommy Gong explained Friday how the system used to count ballots will prevent voters who received two ballots from voting twice.

Each vote-by-mail ballot envelope is issued with a unique voter ID barcode.

All of the 2,600 people who received two ballots, received duplicate ballots that each had the same barcode. If someone attempts to vote twice, which is illegal, "it would be intercepted," Gong said.

The machine will alert the election office workers and physically reject the ballot, placing it in a separate pile, Gong told The Tribune.

"We are instructing voters to only vote one ballot and destroy the other," Gong said.

The vendor responsible for the error is ProVote Solutions, which says it has been [certified by the state for six years](#). This is the first election that the county has contracted with the company, and the contract goes through the November election, according to Gong.

Get 93% off your first month. Subscribe today for \$1.

Rather, the voters received two ballots live across the county, he said.

"It's very unfortunate that they sent this duplicate. I see promise with this vendor, regardless of the circumstances," Gong said.

Original story:

Thousands of voters in San Luis Obispo County received duplicate vote-by-mail ballots for the March 3 primary election, the county's top election official announced Friday morning.

"Upon review, it was discovered that the county's ballot printer and mailhouse vendor had inadvertently processed a supplemental VBM mailing twice, resulting in 2,666 voters receiving a second, identical VBM ballot," San Luis Obispo County clerk-recorder Tommy Gong said in a press release.


Gong said that the current voting system will allow the county elections department to flag any duplicate ballot, "ensuring that only one ballot is counted per voter."

Get 93% off your first month. Subscribe today for \$1.

voters of the situation and how to rectify it," Gong said. "We regret any confusion and inconvenience this has caused."

More than 140,000 local voters are registered to vote by mail this election, Gong said.

Those who received an extra ballot will be sent postcard notifications by the vendor, according to Gong.



San Luis Obispo County voters may receive this postcard.

Carol Broadhurst of Cambria was among the voters who received two vote-by-mail ballots. She and her husband, Michael Broadhurst, are area farmers who co-managed Cambria's Friday farmers market for years.

The Broadhursts will be out of town on Election Day, Carol Broadhurst said Friday, so they requested one-time vote-by-mail ballots for the March 3 primary.

Get 93% off your first month. Subscribe today for \$1.

Get more like this with our subscription.

Broadhurst noted that her son and daughter-in-law, who vote by mail regularly, received single ballots.

Voters with questions about election issues may contact the Elections Division at [805-781-5228](tel:805-781-5228) or visit slocounty.ca.gov/Departments/Clerk-Recorder/Elections-and-Voting.aspx.

There is still time to register to vote if you have not done so or if you moved. You can register online at www.slovote.com until midnight on Tuesday, Feb. 18.

This story was originally published February 14, 2020, 11:49 AM.

RELATED STORIES FROM SAN LUIS OBISPO TRIBUNE

ELECTIONS

This elections company lost its license. Did it change its name to do business in SLO?

JULY 27, 2018 8:22 AM

ELECTIONS

Candidates dig into North County's housing crisis and water woes at SLO Tribune forum

FEBRUARY 13, 2020 2:06 PM



MONICA VAUGHAN



805-781-7930

Monica Vaughan reports on health, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo County, oil and wildlife at The Tribune. She previously covered crime and justice in the Sacramento Valley, is a graduate of the University of Oregon journalism school and is sixth-generation Californian. Have an idea for a story? Email: mvaughan@thetribunenews.com



October 14, 2021

County Clerk/Registrar of Voters (CC/ROV) Memorandum # 21164

TO: All County Clerks/Registrars of Voters
FROM: /s/ Susan Lapsley
Deputy Secretary of State, HAVA and Counsel
RE: Voting Systems: OVSTA Monthly Update –October 2021

Each month, the Office of Voting Systems Technology Assessment (OVSTA) provides an update on Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and Secretary of State (SOS) activities related to voting technology.

Each update provides information on:

- Voting technology related events that may be of interest.
- Administrative approval requests and denials since the prior month's update.
- Voting technology testing and approval at the SOS office.
- Defect, failure, and fault reports issued since the prior month's update.
- Ballot printing certification requests since the prior month's update.

Helpful Updates and Reminders

Post-Election Reporting- After every election, California Elections Code, requires counties to submit the following Post-Election reports:

- One Percent Manual Tally report with submission of your official canvass. See [CCROV #21153](#) for the recommended 1% Manual Tally report form.
- Remote accessible vote by mail (RAVBM) system user report within 30 calendar days of certifying the election results. Attached below is the recommended report form.
- Voting technology incident report form to report any voting technology incidents that occurred during use. Voting technology incidents include, but are not limited to, issues such as paper jams, printing errors, or any defect, fault, or failure pursuant to Elections Code sections 19215 and 19290, and California Code of Regulations section 20161. Attached below is the recommended report form.

Please submit the RAVBM system user and voting technology incident reports for the California Gubernatorial Recall Election to OVSTA on October 14, 2021, by close of business at 5:00PM, via email at VotingSystems@sos.ca.gov.

Tint and Watermark Assignment Requests- The California Code of Regulations section 20280, requires any jurisdiction conducting an election in California to request a ballot tint and watermark from the Secretary of State's Office. Jurisdictions may submit tint and watermark requests to VotingSystems@sos.ca.gov.

When submitting your tint and watermark requests, please provide the following information:

- 1) The name of the jurisdiction conducting the election.
- 2) The date of the election.
- 3) The title of the election.
- 4) The date of the close of candidate filing for the election, if applicable.
- 5) The date on which the ballot order designation will be determined by a randomized alphabet drawing for the election, if applicable.

Disposal or Sale of Equipment- Regarding the disposal or sale of equipment:

- In 2012, the California Secretary of State issued guidance regarding the disposition or sale of equipment purchased with HAVA and/or VMB funding. See Secretary of State (SOS) County Clerk/Registrar of Voters (CC/ROV) Memorandum #12219 - Handling the Sale and Funds from the Sale of Voting Systems or Voting Equipment. The document outlines proper disposal or sale procedures of voting systems or voting equipment purchased with HAVA and/or VMB funding. The document also highlights that all equipment must be void of any software or firmware and returned to a condition of a non-functioning piece of hardware prior to its disposal or sale.
- See also the US-CERT issued Security Tip (ST18-005) outlining proper disposal procedures for electronic devices.

Election Record Retention- As a reminder, pursuant to California Elections Code sections 17301-17306, the retention and preservation of election records, which includes digital ballot images is 22 months. Several voting system tabulation components are capable of producing digital ballot images. Additional information regarding how to backup, retain, and preserve the digital ballot images, and whether or not your jurisdiction's voting system has this capability, can be found in the respective Use Procedures, [here](#).

Further, pursuant to Elections Code section 15209, any magnetic or electronic storage medium used for the ballot tabulation program and any magnetic or electronic storage medium containing election results shall be kept in a secure location and shall be retained for six months following any local election and 22 months following any federal election or so long thereafter as any contest involving the vote at the local or federal election remains undetermined.

Testing and Certification at the EAC

The EAC provides [updates](#) on voting system testing. The latest update from the EAC was provided on March 19, 2021. However, based upon discussions with vendors, no systems currently undergoing testing and certification at the EAC are relevant to California.

Additional information regarding each voting system are available at: "[Voting Systems Under Test](#)" and "[Certified Voting Systems](#)".

On August 17, 2021, the EAC held a two-panel discussion regarding the lessons learned from the 2020 General Election and 2020 EAVS and Policy Survey. More information on the public meeting is available [here](#).

On September 8, 2021, the EAC met to discuss various aspects of the final stages of the VVSG 2.0 implementation. This discussion included the state of developing voting system equipment for VVSG 2.0 compliance, preparation for testing against the new requirements, and the need for VVSG 2.0 compliant systems. More information on the public meeting is available [here](#).

On October 13, 2021, the EAC will be holding a public virtual meeting with the EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) to discuss the development of the VVSG 2.0 standards and lifecycle policy. More information on the public meeting is available [here](#).

Voting Technology Certification and Administrative Approval Requests

OVSTA receives and reviews applications for certification and administrative approval testing from voting technology vendors on a continuous basis. The status of current applications can be found below:

Applicant	System Version	Voting Technology	Submission Date	Type of Testing	Testing Phase
KNOWiNK	Pollpad v2.5.2.01b	ePollBook	09/23/21	Admin Approval	Approved 10/13/2021
KNOWiNK	Pollpad v2.5.2.01b	ePollBook	08/02/21	Admin Approval	Approved 8/16/2021
KNOWiNK	Pollpad v2.5.3	ePollBook	03/02/21	Full Certification	Pre-Test Planning
Hart	Verity Voting 3.1.1	Voting System	05/11/21	Admin Approval	Documentation Review

Dominion	Democracy Suite 5.10A	Voting System	06/23/21	Admin Approval	Approved 8/24/2021
Dominion	Democracy Suite 5.10A	Voting System	08/25/21	Admin Approval	Application Under Review
LA County	VSAP 2.5.2	RAVBM	06/16/21	Admin Approval	Approved 8/21/2021
LA County	VSAP 3.0	Voting System	07/07/21	Full Certification	Application Under Review
Runbeck	Sentio Lite EVS 9.2	Ballot On Demand	04/13/2021	Full Certification	Approved 9/28/2021

Voting System Certification and Approval Requests

OVSTA has received an application for modification of the Hart Verity Voting 3.1.1 voting system. The modifications include replacement of workstations, tablets and printers that are end-of-life and no longer available. The application and supporting documentation are currently under review.

OVSTA has received an application for modification of the Dominion Democracy Suite 5.10A voting system. The application includes addition of SSD drives to the ImageCast Voter Activation (ICVA) laptops and replacement of components that are end-of-life and no longer available. The application and supporting documentation are currently under review.

OVSTA has received an application for testing and certification of Los Angeles County Voting Solutions for All People 3.0 voting system. The application is currently under review.

A list containing certified voting system vendors can be found [here](#).

Remote Accessible Vote By Mail System Certification and Approval Requests

OVSTA received an application for the Los Angeles County Voting Solutions for All People Interactive Sample Ballot 2.5.2 remote accessible vote by mail system. The application includes modifications to the system to support the voter's experience. An approval was granted on August 21, 2021.

A list containing certified remote accessible vote by mail system (RAVBMs) vendors can be found [here](#).

Electronic Poll Book Certification and Approval Requests

OVSTA has received an application for approval of KNOWiNK's Pollpad v2.5.3 electronic poll book system. The system is currently in the pre-testing planning phase.

OVSTA has received an application for modification to KNOWiNK's Pollpad v2.5.2.01b. The application requests the addition of iOS 14.7 and iOS 14.7.1 to the approved system. An approval was granted on August 16, 2021.

OVSTA has received an application for modification to KNOWiNK's Pollpad v2.5.2.01b. The application requests the addition of iOS 14.8 to the approved system. An approval was granted on October 13, 2021.

A list containing certified electronic poll book vendors can be found [here](#).

Ballot on Demand Printing Certification and Approval Requests

OVSTA received an application in April from Runbeck Election Services, requesting certification for the Sentio Ballot Printing System version 9.2 for printing of Dominion ImageCast ballots, Election Systems & Software Electionware ballots, and Hart InterCivic Verity ballots. An approval was granted on September 28, 2021.

A list of certified ballot on demand systems can be found [here](#).

Ballot Printing Certification and Approval Requests

OVSTA received an application from Toppan Merrill, requesting certification for printing of Dominion ImageCast ballots. The application is currently in the initial review phase.

A list of certified ballot printers can be found [here](#).

Defects, Faults, Failures and Other Error Reporting

Voting Technology Incidents- As a reminder, California Elections Code, California Code of Regulations, and conditions of certification, require jurisdictions to submit the following reports regarding the defect, fault, or failure of any voting system, ePollbook or RAVBM system or ballot printer:

- Notification of any voting system defect, fault, or failure within 30 days of discovery (California Election Code [Section 19210](#)).
- Notification of any RAVBM defect, fault, or failure within 30 days of discovery (California Election Code [Section 19284](#)).
- Notification of any ePollBook breach, attempted breach, defect, failure or fault within 24 hours of discovery (California Code of Regulations [Section 20161](#)).
- Notification of any ballot card printing flaw or defect within 2 days of discovery (California Election Code [Section 13004](#)).

Due to an error by the ballot printing vendor, some Tehama County Vote-By-Mail ballots for September's Gubernatorial Recall Election had a print error that caused the tabulator to not be able to read the ballots. This did not affect voters' vote from counting. The ballot printing vendor, ProVote, investigated the issue and discovered that due to human error, the static layer containing the ballot image was not removed prior to the vote by mail ballots being printed. ProVote stated that 30,512 of the mailed ballots were affected. Tehama County worked in four-person bi partisan teams to duplicate the affected ballots.

During preparation of Los Angeles County's electronic poll books for September's Gubernatorial Recall Election, the electronic poll book vendor KNOWiNK improperly loaded a batch of electronic poll books with the voter file of a previous election. Before the matter was identified and remediated, affected voters during a short period of early voting were required to vote provisionally as the improperly loaded electronic poll books identified voters as already voting in the election. Upon realizing the error during early voting, the affected electronic pollbooks were immediately replaced. KNOWiNK has developed and implemented additional processes to the quality control procedures to verify all pollbooks are assigned to the correct election and has revised and distributed documentation related to election imports. Additionally, KNOWiNK will conduct hands-on training with all applicable staff on the staging process prior to every election, limit the individuals which have access to assign elections within the ePulse System, and enhance the Poll Pad® application so that users will see an alert in the application if the Poll Pad is set to an invalid configuration which will be available for certification and use in 2022 elections.

Print Form



Voting Technology Incident Reporting Form

Use the following form to report any voting technology incident that occurred during use. Voting technology incidents include, but are not limited to, issues such as paper jams, printing errors, or any defect, fault or failure pursuant to Election Code sections 19215 and 19290, and California Code of Regulations section 20161.

A. Election Official:

Jurisdiction

Name

Title

Phone Number

Email

Reported to Vendor

Yes

No

B. Product Description:

Vendor Name

Type of Voting Technology

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ballot Marking Device | <input type="checkbox"/> Ballot on Demand |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Central Scanner/Tabulator | <input type="checkbox"/> Precinct Tabulator |
| <input type="checkbox"/> RAVBM | <input type="checkbox"/> ePollbook |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Other |

System Model

Hardware & Software Versions

Unit Serial Numbers

C. Description of Incident(s):

Date of Occurrence

Voting Location

Election Name

Date of Election

Description of Each Incident. Attach Additional Sheets if Necessary.



Remote Accessible Vote by Mail (RAVBM) Reporting Form

Print Form

For any election that a California jurisdiction uses a remote accessible vote by mail system, the jurisdiction shall provide a report to the Secretary of State, within 30 calendar days of certifying the election results, listing the number of voters that used the system and all technical issues reported (if any), along with any mitigations.

A. Election Official:

Jurisdiction

Name

Title

Contact Phone Number

Contact Email

B. Product Description:

RAVBM URL or Online Address

Type of RAVBM

Democracy Live

LA County VSAP ISB

Dominion

Five Cedars Group

RAVBM Technical Assistance Telephone Number

Number of Voters that Registered to use RAVBM

Number of Voters that Voted using the RAVBM

C. Description of RAVBM Usage:

Election Name

Dates RAVBM was Available

Date of Election

Description of Technical Issues and Mitigations if Any.
Attach Additional Sheets if Necessary.

Search

Weld County ballots sorted by hand after barcode misprint

John Marinelli

PUBLISHED: October 18, 2019 at 6:57 p.m. | UPDATED: April 3, 2020 at 12:12 a.m.

Latest Headlines, News, Uncategorized

Listen to this article



Peter Chandler hands over his ballot to Weld County Election official Rhonda Swetnam at city hall in Erie on the morning of election day, 2014. Photo by Paul Aiken / The Boulder Daily Camera / April 1, 2014

Due to a printing mistake on the envelope for mail-in ballots in Weld County, post office staff and county officials are hand sorting them to make sure all votes are delivered and counted.

According to a press release from Weld County, an error in printing the bar codes on the envelopes has made it so that post office workers are unable to automatically process ballots and send them to their proper destination.

“The post office is hand-processing the ballots to make sure a printer error in the bar code on the return envelope does not cause a problem,” the release said.



Carly Koppes, Weld County clerk and recorder, said that the county is “still working to figure out exactly” how many ballots were affected.

“At this point, we’re just saying that it was our first initial mailing, which was pretty much all of our active voters,” she said.

She added that any supplemental ballots mailed in the future will not have the error.



“We already have confirmed with our print vendor that the situation has been eradicated and will not happen with all the supplemental ballots that we’re going to still be mailing out,” said Koppes.

ProVote Solutions, the vendor that printed the envelopes, did not respond to a request for comment.

Koppes said that there have not been any lost ballots as a result of the issue and that the county has been in daily communication with the post office.

“Our return envelopes are green, which, I’m really glad they are. It makes it a lot easier to see them in the postal system,” said Koppes.

James Boxrud, a spokesman for the United States Postal Service’s Western area, said that the “bright green envelopes” have helped postal workers identify ballots. He

added that postal staff has been “isolating all completed ballots, and Weld County has made arrangements to pick them up on a daily basis.”

Boxrud said that there will be no delay in processing votes, though if Weld County voters choose to mail in their ballots, he urges people to remember to use a stamp and mail it in time to arrive at its destination before 7 p.m. on Nov. 5, the day of the election.

COROLLA



 **TOYOTA**

Hybrid gas models only

Koppes said that the priority of the post office, Weld County and ProVote Solutions is to make sure all ballots get to their destination.

The release from Weld County stated that “notwithstanding the barcode error” mailed ballots would be delivered to the county’s election office, though if people are concerned, there are 14 different 24-hour drop-off locations that ballots can be taken to.

“So far ... our solution is working quite well,” she said. “And if a voter for some reason gets their ballot back, then that’s why we’re saying go ahead and just drop it off at a 24-hour box.”

For a full list of ballot drop-off locations, visit bit.ly/33HWC24.

Share this:



View more on [Longmont Times-Call](#)

Here Are 23 Of The Coolest Gifts For 2023

23 Hottest Cool Gifts In 2023 You'll Regret Not Getting Before They Sell Out

Best Tech Trend | Sponsored

Photos that Americans have never seen before

Incredibly rare historical photos to show you the other side of the past

TravelerDreams | Sponsored

[Read More](#)

Bride outwits mother-in-law, guestlist battle won with style.

A clever bride managed her vicious mother-in-law's demand for only 100 wedding guests

TravelerMaster | Sponsored

[Read More](#)

Get Youthful Skin: Amazon's Top Selling 'Botox In A Bottle'

BrunchesHCrunches | Sponsored



ITEM #11
11/07/2023

November 3rd, 2023

To: Board of Supervisors
Fresno County Hall of Records
2281 Tulare Street, Room 301
Fresno, CA 93721

Re: Meeting of November 7th, Agenda Item 11 under File #23-1272

Dear members of the Fresno County Board of Supervisors,

Please find this letter as an affirmation of our commitment to Fresno County and justification as to why ProVote**Solutions** (ProVote) is the most qualified choice as your professional election printer.

We presume the Board has some history of vendor concerns, so for the sake of brevity, I will keep our points as concise as possible to support a quick decision.

- ProVote is well-established, highly respected, and financially sound. ProVote is also the largest election printer located in California. We have invested over \$5,000,000 in systems, services, and equipment during the last 18 months, solely to support our customers and enhance the quality and security of our election printing services. These investments not only added capacity and redundancy, but they also served to increase our quality inspections and auditing capabilities so we can provide our counties with assurance that their elections run smoothly.

These investments include but are not limited to:

- ◆ A fourth certified election press that can print more than 1,000,000 ballots per day. This addition not only balances our production needs but also significantly increases the quality of the printed ballots. We are confident in our ability to handle Fresno County's election printing needs, even within the current timeframe.
 - ◆ A quarter-million-dollar inline camera inspection system capable of capturing 4K still images of the ballots, front and back, and flagging any potential issues. This system scans the printed image and compares it to the intended image at high speed. It is so sensitive that it will flag an errant pixel incorrectly printed or even a small insect that lands on the ballot.
 - ◆ A second high-speed cut and fold line for increased capacity and redundancy.
 - ◆ A second inserting line was designed specifically for the demands of California VBM needs. This includes a full camera-matching system to ensure the delivered quality and audit trail of VBM ballots.
 - ◆ Images of all VBM packets are captured for future audit in case of questions.
- We are a highly secure facility, complete with RFID and fenced perimeters, zoned internal operations, surveillance, and a SOC2 data secure operation. We understand security and incorporate it into our business methodology before our customers must ask. It is part of the integrity embedded within our pricing.
 - Upon review of both contracts on the agenda, once the incumbent vendor requested an additional allowance of \$45,000 per year to increase the security of their operation, they were no longer the most cost-competitive option for Fresno taxpayers. The final printing cost for an election involves a myriad of variables. But we calculated multiple scenarios of the most significant costs and found that ProVote was the most competitive. Please see the second-page price comparison, based upon a single 18" ballot.
 - Our Past President and I are both Fresno County residents. While ProVote provides election printing services for nearly half of the counties in California, our company leadership has a personal interest in the error-free success of Fresno County elections.

In summary, when considering cost, quality, and security, ProVote**Solutions** is clearly the best option for Fresno County and its taxpayers.

Respectfully,


Paul Mantey, President

ProVoteSolutions

Description	Nov. 2022 Election Data	March 2024 Projection	ProVote	IVS
VBM Ballots Mailed	514,390	529,800	\$262,251.00	\$264,900.00
Vote Center Ballot on Demand paper stock	63,200	65,100	\$7,812.00	\$9,765.00
Vote Center ICX paper stock	35,600	36,700	\$4,404.00	\$5,505.00
Test paper stock (Ballot on Demand)	4,800	4,900	\$1,470.00	\$1,274.00
Test paper stock (ICX)	3,200	3,300	\$988.80	\$858.00
Test ballots		0		
Voter Instructions (8.5 x 11" single sheet)		535,000	\$24,610.00	\$32,100.00
Return Envelopes - Mass mailing & supplemental mailings		535,000	\$35,310.00	\$44,405.00
Outgoing Envelopes - Mass mailing & supplemental mailings		535,000	\$32,635.00	\$37,450.00
CVR Envelopes (361 Voter Centers x 75 CVR for each location)		27,100	\$11,165.20	\$9,485.00
Extra Polling Place Ballot Boxes		1,000	\$4,390.00	\$1,500.00
Set up Charges			\$475.00	
8D2 Cards		100,000	\$11,500.00	\$14,000.00
VIG Inkjet Addressing		535,000	\$27,820.00	\$37,450.00
		Pre Total	\$424,831.00	\$458,692.00
		Plus \$45k With 10% Pre-Pay Discount		\$503,692.00 \$453,322.80
Assumed factors		Post Total	\$424,831.00	\$453,322.80
1 card 18" ballot VBM Ballots Mailed included ballot cost plus assembly cost.				

Pro Document Solutions
Balance Sheet
December 31, 2022

ASSETS

Current Assets		
Cash in Bank	\$ 6,965,155.66	
Accounts Receivable	1,830,550.04	
C/P of Due from Related Parties	0.00	
Inventory	2,530,602.04	
Prepaid Expenses	142,061.09	
Exchange	1,246.96	
	<hr/>	
Total Current Assets		11,469,615.79
Property and Equipment		
Furniture & Equipment: Paso	3,389,081.78	
Furniture & Equipment: Port	8,164,256.39	
Vehicles: Paso	7,574.00	
Vehicles: Port	93,495.54	
Computer Equipment: Paso	124,749.39	
Computer Equipment: Port	87,348.42	
Leasehold Improvements Paso	333,911.95	
Leasehold Improvements Port	911,434.40	
Less Accumulated Depreciation	(12,951,083.26)	
	<hr/>	
Total Property and Equipment		160,768.61
Intangible Assets		
Goodwill - SVS Purchase	1,183,129.00	
Loan Fees	42,770.00	
Accumulated Amortization	(1,142,834.92)	
Accum Amort - Loan Fees	(42,770.00)	
	<hr/>	
Total Intangibles - Net		40,294.08
Other Assets		
Vendor Prepayments and Deposit	(411.46)	
Deposits - Workers Comp	0.00	
Due from Related Parties	203,586.98	
	<hr/>	
Total Other Assets		203,175.52
Total Assets	\$	<u><u>11,873,854.00</u></u>

Pro Document Solutions
Balance Sheet
December 31, 2022


LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL

Current Liabilities		
Accounts Payable	\$	207,211.01
Notes Payable		0.00
Current Portion of Notes		423,083.00
Accrued Sales Tax 2017-19 Audit		(32,237.14)
Accrued Sales Tax		26,976.83
Accrued Expenses		565,558.59
Customer Deposits		(382.71)
Deferred Taxes		0.00
State & Fed Income Tax Payable		838,714.00
		<hr/>
Total Current Liabilities		2,028,923.58
Long-Term Liabilities		
SVS Purchase Liability		(3,200.00)
Less Current Portion of Notes		(423,083.00)
Canon C10010VP Cap FMV Lease		183,021.56
IFS Cap Lease #1 - MBO 0012146		672,694.89
IFS Cap Lease #2-VIDEK 0012233		178,431.11
PNC Bank - Screen InkJet Press		305,268.41
PNC Bank - Screen Finishing		66,351.33
PPB *1417 W+D Loan		129,024.00
NW Mutual Life Loan		19,074.37
		<hr/>
Total Long-Term Liabilities		1,127,582.67
		<hr/>
Total Liabilities		3,156,506.25
Capital		
Preferred Stock - Series E		0.00
Common Stock		443,409.48
Owner's Drawing		0.00
Retained Earnings		4,743,068.36
Net Income		3,530,869.91
		<hr/>
Total Capital		8,717,347.75
		<hr/>
Total Liabilities & Capital	\$	<u><u>11,873,854.00</u></u>

PROVOTE CA COUNTY CUSTOMER LIST

County	Number of Registered Voters	Registrar of Voters/Elections Director	Email	Phone Number	Fax Number	Country Contact Information	Physical/Mailing Address
Bloom County, CA	323,935	Kevin Smith	elections@bloomcounty.net	530-552-3000	530-538-4853	155 Nelson Ave, Orpelle, CA 95965-3411	
Calaveras County, CA	10,144	Babcock Amsler	elections@calaveras.ca.us	209-754-4376	209-754-6733	851 Mountain Ranch Road, San Andreas, CA 95249	
Colusa County, CA	14,943	Chris Jara Edwards	elections@colusa.ca.us	530-458-0300	530-458-0512	548 Jay Street, Suite 200, Colusa, CA 95932	
Contra Costa County, CA	138,837	Bill O'Neill	elections@contracosta.ca.us	707-464-7216	707-465-0331	981 H Street, Room 160, Concord City, CA 94531	
Deer Creek County, CA	14,395	Sammy Perez	elections@deercreek.ca.us	530-431-7480	530-426-5514	2850 Redwood Court, Placerville, CA 95667	
El Dorado County, CA	86,992	Linsey J. Dale	elections@el-dorado-county.ca.us	530-434-6414	530-294-6571	516 W. Steamboat Street, 2nd Floor, Williams, CA 95988	
Imperial County, CA	10,725	Danielle Seaton	elections@imperial.ca.us	442-365-1060	442-365-1062	140 W. Main Street, Suite 200, El Centro, CA 92243	
King County, CA	438,872	Amelia X. Espinoza	elections@kingcounty.ca.us	661-468-3390	661-468-3768	1135 Truxtun Avenue, First Floor, Bakersfield, CA 93301	
Kern County, CA	61,535	Laura Villa	elections@kern.ca.us	805-835-4401	805-835-4401	1400 W. Lacey Blvd., Bldg. #77, Hanford, CA 93230	
Lake County, CA	37,154	Maria Valparis	elections@lakecounty.ca.us	530-425-4401	530-425-4401	353 W. Imperial Hwy., Kennett, CA 95945	
Los Angeles County, CA	5,601,835	Devin Logan	elections@lacounty.ca.us	213-232-2728	213-232-2728	310 W. 9th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012	
Madison County, CA	71,865	Rebecca Miranda	elections@madisoncounty.ca.us	707-332-5700	707-332-5700	310 W. 9th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012	
Mariposa County, CA	11,558	Gregory Proffger Morrow	elections@mariposa.ca.us	209-935-5700	209-935-5700	310 W. 9th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012	
Mendocino County, CA	87,710	John J. DeHaven	elections@mendocino.ca.us	707-332-5700	707-332-5700	310 W. 9th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012	
Mono County, CA	13,848	Matt DeBokor	elections@mono.ca.us	707-332-5700	707-332-5700	310 W. 9th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012	
Butte County, CA	131,505	Matthew Caballes	elections@butte.ca.us	530-733-5331	530-733-5331	74 N. School Street, Ames, CA 95920	
Butte County, CA	13,848	Matt DeBokor	elections@butte.ca.us	707-332-5700	707-332-5700	310 W. 9th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012	
San Luis Obispo County, CA	182,340	Elaine Cano	elections@slco.ca.us	530-733-5331	530-733-5331	1127 First St., San Luis Obispo, CA 93401	
Santa Clara County, CA	2,210	Heather Foster	elections@santacleara.ca.us	408-482-7100	408-482-7100	320 Main Street, Room 102, Lodi, CA 93240	
Siskiyou County, CA	28,725	Laura Brum	elections@siskiyou.ca.us	530-733-5331	530-733-5331	2724 Gateway Drive, Riverside, CA 92507-2928	
Sonoma County, CA	308,072	Debra Marie Probst	elections@sonoma.ca.us	530-491-4110	530-491-4110	1025 Montgomery Square, Suite 111, P.O. Drawer D, Donnellville, CA 95936-0398	
Stanislaus County, CA	282,393	Donna Under	elections@stanislauscounty.ca.us	707-465-0864	707-465-0864	311 Fourth Street, Room 201, Yuba City, CA 95607	
Sutter County, CA	59,896	Donna H. Johnston	elections@sutter.ca.us	209-525-5000	209-525-5003	433 Fiscal Drive, Santa Fe, CA 95403	
Tulare County, CA	37,131	Jennifer Viles	elections@tularecounty.ca.us	530-827-7122	530-827-7122	10311 Street, Suite 101, Modesto, CA 95354-2331	
Yuba County, CA	208,863	Michelle Baldwin	elections@yuba.ca.us	530-327-4100	530-327-4100	1433 Veterans Memorial Circle, Yuba City, CA 95693	
Yuba County, CA	118,797	James Salinas	elections@yuba.ca.us	530-327-4100	530-327-4100	633 Washington Street, Room 17, Yuba City, CA 95600	
Yuba County, CA	41,332	Donna Hilligates	elections@yuba.ca.us	530-327-4100	530-327-4100	1515 S. Highway 99, Marysville, CA 95971	
Yuba County, CA	41,332	Donna Hilligates	elections@yuba.ca.us	530-327-4100	530-327-4100	1515 S. Highway 99, Marysville, CA 95971	

GHOSTmark™




Secure Ballot Paper



in partnership with





A WHITE PAPER FOR DISCUSSION ON PAPER BALLOT SECURITY

Leveraging our backgrounds in security printing, ProVoteSolutions and ISP have carefully considered the benefits of a print-based ballot security feature.

This white paper focuses on the following primary points:

- Why the “need” for print or paper-based ballot security?
- Why was this technology ultimately chosen and created?
- What is a GHOSTmark™ seal?

Why Is There A Need?

In the last few years, the news cycles have demonstrated that election integrity and concerns over security have become a significant part of our national conversation. Having been in election printing for over 20 years, and a leader in security printing for over 30 years, we understand the foundation of security begins and ends with the strength of the security technology and a proper chain of custody. The slightest perception of a security breach, whether valid or not, brings into question the integrity of an entire system.

Our nation's elections are at the pinnacle of this exposure.

The states, counties, and system providers have done a good job providing voters with an election system that provides security through tight controls, certifications, and chain of custody policies. Still, there are instances that a chain of custody policy may fall under public scrutiny. A more comprehensive ballot security feature, outside of typical public access, would help alleviate those concerns and assure trust within the voting public.

In short, all security within a printed paper ballot is based upon its chain of custody alone. Since there are multiple paper suppliers and printing methods, the raw materials do not inherently provide security through chain of custody.



"Rated number one document security technology provider in the US for 7 years in a row"

Why the GHOSTmark™ technology?

With 20 technology patents, our experience in security development enables us to provide effective solutions which encompass all security technologies; including true paper watermarks, security inks, holograms, and encrypted anti-copy backgrounds. Our experience in election printing gives us the insight to understand the feasibility of solutions when considering cost and logistics. Given the sheer volume and limited timeframe inherent in election printing, it is critical that a printed ballot security feature not interfere with 100% accuracy and 100% on-time delivery.

In order to be most effective, ProVote**Solutions** and ISP determined the GHOSTmark™ security feature should meet the following minimum requirements:



- Require minimal investment, achieving a high value to cost ratio. The current targeted cost is roughly \$0.05 per ballot depending on quantity, coverage, and application.
- Will work with all election systems and certified papers.
- Can be offered in two options: Either totally covert (invisible), or partially overt (visible) so voters can also verify its presence.
- Offer levels of validation that are easy to relay to voters and election workers. With the overt option it's possible to alert the voting public of the security feature and describe what to look for on the ballot itself.
- The public is already somewhat familiar with watermarks, but broader adoption would increase familiarity (like currency).
- Both options offer embedded covert security, making higher level forensic validation possible.
- Capable of being printed by all certified printers with offset presses.
- Can be customized by state, county, and/or specific elections.
- Using GHOSTmark™ security seal creates a ballot in which the paper is further secured by chain of custody and not commonly available to the public.
- Securing the reply envelope was considered. It was determined that the ballot itself is the best and most important option for the application of the GHOSTmark™ security seal since it is archived in the record.

What is GHOSTmark™?

GHOSTmark™ security seal is a high-resolution printed image, utilizing a unique security ink with several overt and covert properties embedded within it. The GHOSTmark™ technology is patent pending.

Since most ballots are digitally printed (in-plant, on demand, thermal, etc.), GHOSTmark™ security seal was designed outside the ability of digital printing. The combination of high-resolution imaging and ink technology within the seal are beyond the capabilities of any digital device.

GHOSTmark™ security seal can be customized for a state, county, or any specific election without creating anything that can be traceable to the voter for privacy reasons.




What is GHOSTmark™?

GHOSTmark™ security seal ink properties can be broken into the following layers:

- With the overt option, the ink is approximately the same color as the paper. This is also known as a reflective watermark, not to be confused with current watermarks printed in the ballot head. The reflective watermark is mostly visible when tilting toward or away from a strong light source.
- With the covert option, the ink is totally invisible, so the voter does not know the security exists on the ballot.
- Among the ink additives is an invisible UV pigment which excites (glows) under a black light. The image is easily visible in any environment because of the pigment colors chosen.
- Also embedded in the ink are rare infrared (IR) taggants which are designed to excite in the infrared spectrum. These are commonly validated using small readers which can recognize the IR properties and return a response (lights, beeps, buzzes, etc.). This rare taggant is mostly impervious and can survive both chemicals and fire.

With the overt option, the reflective watermark could be validated by the voter. If they had a black light, they could potentially verify the UV, too.

The UV and rare IR properties would typically be validated by an election official or someone who would have the necessary device and training to confirm the feature.



GHOSTmark™ Implementation

This technology is an ideal solution for the election environment. ProVote**Solutions** and ISP are now accepting applications for counties who wish to participate in pilot programs and scaled testing. But we are also seeking to achieve additional milestones in order to further implement GHOSTmark™ security seal.

- Guidance, approval, and certification of Secretaries of State and proper election stakeholders.
- Confirmation of compatibility from the election system providers.

This is an optimum time to enhance voter trust by adding layered security to increase the chain of custody security inherent to ballots. GHOSTmark™ security seal certainly deters ballot counterfeiting efforts. But more importantly, it provides voter confidence that our elections are secure.

We appreciate all input during this exploratory stage. Contact us directly if you would like to explore GHOSTmark™ security seal for your county.

Sincerely,

Noal Phillips, President
International Security Products, Inc.
(805) 423-0306



Paul Mantey, President
ProVoteSolutions
(559) 719-2134





www.provotesolutions.com

info@provotesolutions.com

Phone: 1 (800) 681-1171

Fax: 1 (800) 233-1086

