

ALL SUPERVISORS:
PUBLIC COMMENT.

Fw: California High-Speed Rail Authority Board of Directors Meeting Agenda for April 29, 2026 - Amended

NEXT
MTG.



From: Joseph P Thompson (translaw@pacbell.net)

To: ray.appleton@cumulus.com; info@kmjnow.com; realtalkbrad@gmail.com; reply-rbr9upqjmb-cwjqc8qvbe-ncryrcepikglls@info.stevhiltonforgovernor.com; info@gates4ag.com; info@reformcalifornia.org; info@davidtangipa4ca.com; ca05tm.outreach@mail.house.gov; tomlorimcc@comcast.net; repkevinkiley@mail8.housecommunications.gov; repvincefong@mail8.housecommunications.gov; repdavidvaladao@mail.house.gov; assemblymember.macedo@assembly.ca.gov; rosalia.alexander@asm.ca.gov; senator.strickland@senate.ca.gov; joyce.rivero@sen.ca.gov; info@garrybredefeld.com; nathan@nathanmagsig.com; tbrusseau@centralvalleygroup.com; kathy@californiaglobe.com

Date: Monday, April 27, 2026 at 07:12 PM PDT

RECEIVED
APR 30 2026

CLERK, BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

FYI: AN EXPERT'S OPINION ON THE NEW 2026 "BUSINESS PLAN" FROM CAHSRA

Dear Mr. Appleton,

CC:-d:- Mr. Hilton, Congressmen McClintock, Kiley, Fong & Valadao; Assemblymembers Tangipa, Macedo & DeMaio;

- Senator Strickland; Supervisors Bredefeld & Magsig; Mr. Maaske. Ms. Grimes

FYI. Not the opinion of a country lawyer with a lifetime in transportation; but rather, the opinion of an expert. Tom was the expert witness for Santa Clara County Taxpayers Assn in their litigation with VTA, SCC's equal to FAX-FUX-FNO in Fresno.

He co-authored the Reason Foundation's pre-Election analysis of Prop. 1A in 2008.

So, with the governing statute for government approval of rail mergers on the books, 49 USC 11324(c), "in the public interest," where is the leadership for diverting the CAHSRA's Supermassive Black Hole to a capitalist railroad, e.g., our Class Ones in California, UPRR, whose merger application is pending at the Surface Transportation Board, and BNSF. Both the envy of the World when it comes to railroads.

As in "railroads;" not horizontal socialist elevators conceived insolvent, born bankrupt.

Joe Thompson
(408) 607--7351 cell phone
Fresno, CA 93711 in Mr. McClintock's District

----- Forwarded Message -----

From: Joseph P Thompson <translaw@pacbell.net>

To: tarubin@earthlink.net <tarubin@earthlink.net>

Sent: Monday, April 27, 2026 at 06:58:32 PM PDT

Subject: Re: California High-Speed Rail Authority Board of Directors Meeting Agenda for April 29, 2026 - Amended

Dear Tom,

One year AST&L awarded me "Best Research Paper," can't remember, but maybe 1993-94. Anyhow, after accepting the award, I went over to UPRR's HQ, and somehow managed to get an appointment with their top guy for Intermodal. Went into a Conference Room, just the two of us. Table was longer than ones they use in Buckingham Palace. Told him what I thought about restoration of intermodal facilities for the Central California Coast Region. They had closed them in Salinas Valley and Santa Clara Valley. During the Vietnam War I was graveyard shift supervisor for the one in San Jose. Spent 10 years 1970-1980 with UPRR Traffic in San Jose, tracing, expediting and diverting TOFC produce trailers and PFE Reefers on the "Salad Bowl Express," 7th morning schedule promised to the ag shippers. Went SP-Ogden-UP-Council Bluffs-CNW-Chicago-PC. In hot weather out here, they would load lettuce before they had a buyer for it. Enroute, they would sell,

and then need to divert one of their "roller cars" to they buyer, e.g., Piggly-Wiggly, Atlanta. So, when they called, I had to find out if it has passed over the hump at North Platte. If not, then I could divert it. If too late for North Platte, then they'd have to call the CNW or PC. All too often unsold lettuce, etc., reached Hunts Point Market in NYC, where it sold cheap.

UP HQ was 1600 Dodge Street in Omaha.

Also had a tour of the Harriman Dispatch Center. Looked like SAC HQ with all the displays covering the walls.

All the best my friend.

Caveat viator.

Joe Thompson

(408) 607---7351 cell phone

On Monday, April 27, 2026 at 06:39:28 PM PDT, <tarubin@earthlink.net> wrote:

TAR: There is a statutory requirement for the California High Speed Rail Authority to adopt annual business plans.

So, they do.

There is no statutory requirement for any such plan to have any connection, no matter how remote, with reality, nor make the slightest bit of sense.

So, I recommend that you treat the CaHSRA business plans with every bit of respect it deserves.

No, don't know of any discussion group where they discuss the CaHSRA business plans – that is just too hard to do because it takes so long for everyone to stop laughing.

I grew up in Omaha, Nebraska, where, for years, I drove up and down Dodge Street more days than I didn't. If Lincoln has listened to Dodge, we'd still be riding horses.

... and I know the story of the instructions that Leland Standard, who was then the California Governor, gave to the State Geologist as to where the Sierra Mountains began.

Tom Rubin

From: Joseph P Thompson <translaw@pacbell.net>

Sent: Monday, April 27, 2026 6:17 PM

To: Tom Rubin <tarubin@earthlink.net>

Subject: Fw: California High-Speed Rail Authority Board of Directors Meeting Agenda for April 29, 2026 - Amended

Dear Tom,

On the Agenda: **Adopt the 2026 "Business Plan"?**

So, WTF. What does this remind you of? Lenin's "business plan" to run Russia with communism? Is their "Business Plan" really an insolvency-kept-running-with-more-taxpayers'-subsidies plan?

More insolvency than Amtrak and Caltrain combined?

In 1864 when Granville Dodge told Lincoln that the TC railroad must be government owned, Lincoln said, No. And why would a transportation attorney say "no" to a government owned railroad?

Was it because he knew what happened with the Illinois Central in the Crash of 1837?

Do you know anyone or any discussion group where they discuss this "Business Plan"?

Joe Thompson

(408) 607---7351 cell phone

Fresno, CA 93711

----- Forwarded Message -----

From: California High-Speed Rail <info@hst-gmail.com>

To: "translaw@pacbell.net" <translaw@pacbell.net>

Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2026 at 12:55:45 PM PDT

Subject: California High-Speed Rail Authority Board of Directors Meeting Agenda for April 29, 2026 - Amended

To view the original or a full page go [here](#).



CALIFORNIA High-Speed Rail Authority

Board of Directors Meeting Agenda (Amended)

April 29, 2026

9:30 a.m.

Main Location

California Environmental Protection Agency
Byron Sher Room
1001 I Street,
Sacramento, CA 95814

Location

Pacifica Services, Inc.
106 South Mentor Avenue, #200
Pasadena, CA 91106



The California High-Speed Rail Authority's April 29, 2026, board meeting will be conducted in-person and via webinar. Board Members may participate in

JOSEPH P. THOMPSON

Attorney at Law

952 School Street, #376, Napa, CA 94559

Cellphone (408) 607-7351

E-mail: TransLaw@aPacBell.Net

SHORT VERSION:

Joe Thompson is a graduate of the Santa Clara University School of Law. He is admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, all U.S. District Courts in California, and before the California Supreme Court. He is past-president (twice) of the Gilroy--Morgan Hill Bar Assn.

LONG VERSION:

Joe Thompson was a member of the Transportation Lawyers Assn., and served on TLA's legislation (past Chair), intermodal, arbitration, and freight claims committees. He was a member of Transportation & Logistics Council, Inc. He has served on the Executive Committee of the Santa Clara County Bar Assn.'s Debtor-Creditor-Commercial Law Section. He was a member of the Association for Transportation Law, Logistics & Policy, and a candidate for the American Society for Transportation and Logistics. He served on the Government Review Councils of the San Benito County and Gilroy Chambers of Commerce, and was a member of the Gavilan Employers Advisory Council. He was appointed to the San Benito County Citizens Rail Advisory Committee, San Benito County Citizens Transit Task Force, and served on the Steering Committee of the Safe Kids Coalition. He was a member of Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways, and the Conference of Freight Counsel. He received the National Directors Award for the best transportation research paper in the U.S. in 1997 from the AST&L. During Governor Pete Wilson's administration, he participated three years in the Regulatory Reform Roundtable. He is a 1966 graduate of the Motor Carrier Fleet Safety Supervisor School at U.C.-Berkeley, and was employed as dispatcher and supervisor by Pacific Motor Trucking (1964-1970), and as clerk by Union Pacific Railroad (1970-1980). His articles have been published by Transportation Law Journal, Western Growers Association Magazine, and Transportation Lawyer Magazine and Salinas Californian.

JOSEPH THOMPSON

High Speed Rail project is a giant boondoggle

The following was submitted by email to the Morgan Hill City Council as public input prior to the council's scheduled Nov. 15 workshop on the California High Speed Rail project.

I am a past President of Gilroy-Morgan Hill Bar Association, a member of the Transportation Lawyers Association, and past Chair of TLA's Legislation Committee. I have practiced transportation law in the South County for 38 years, and have done post-doctoral study of transportation law and policy at the Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies, and at Transportation Research Board, Georgetown University; and at the Library of Congress. I am a graduate of SJSU, and the University of Santa Clara Law School, and I have 52 years of transportation industry experience dating back to my junior year at Cupertino High School, when I worked for the SPRR, and later at UPRR in San Jose (1970-1980).

My comments are personal, and not made on behalf of a client or any professional organization to which I belong.

For a state that cannot afford adequate fire suppression, or water storage, it is bad public policy to add to the public transit boondoggles that the taxpayers (mostly motorists) already shoulder, under the worst tax/fee burdens among all the states.

What the California High Speed Rail Authority is doing, which is not what voters voted for in Prop. 1A in 2008, is contrary to the conclusions of both the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Transport Funding, and the California Transportation Commission. Both of them concluded that we ought to fund transport with "user fees."

Giving away transit rides, by any mode, with fares near zero, diverting the costs to motorists' gas and diesel taxes, is unfair,

unsound, and unsustainable transport policy.

Taxing people out of their cars is a public policy plunging us down the Road to Serfdom, intended to cripple our state's economy.

We already pay our taxes for many wasteful boondoggles like Amtrak, Caltrain, ACE Train, BART, Light Rail and county transit, when it would be much cheaper for taxpayers if we just purchased each transit rider his own BMW, or paid his taxi fare, or his Uber fare.

“We already pay our taxes for many wasteful boondoggles like Amtrak, Caltrain, ACE Train, BART, Light Rail and county transit, when it would be much cheaper for taxpayers if we just purchased each transit rider his own BMW.”

California's voters voted for self-sufficient high speed rail, not a Supermassive Black Hole added to the already intolerable public sector transit Black Holes that our lost leadership forces us to subsidize.

This bad public policy is making California into Northern Venezuela. I urge local leaders to support the repeal of Prop. 1A.

Caveat viator.

Joseph Thompson is an attorney whose law offices are in Gilroy. He can be reached at translaw@pacbell.net.

E-mail: TransLaw@PacBell.Net



Joseph P. Thompson
Attorney at Law

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Napa, CA 94559

TEL: 408/848-5506

Fw: LegiScan Monitoring

ALL B. J.S. = PUBLIC COMMENT - NEXT MEETING
Item # 11
5/12/26 BOS Mtg

From: Joseph P Thompson (translaw@pacbell.net)

ray.appleton@cumulus.com; info@kmjnow.com; kmjbrad@gmail.com; caltalkbrad@gmail.com;
info@garrybredefeld.com; nathan@nathanmagsig.com; tbrusseau@centralvalleygroup.com; reply-rbr9upqjmb-
cwjqc8qvbe-ncryncpikglls@info.stevehiltonforgovernor.com; teamhilton@stevehiltonforgovernor.com;
info@gates4ag.com; mike.karbassi@fresno.gov; assemblymember.tangipa@outreach.assembly.ca.gov;
david@davidtangipaforassembly.com; assemblymember.tangipa@assembly.ca.gov; info@davidtangipa4ca.com;
ian.coolbear@asm.ca.gov; beile.castro@asm.ca.gov; emily.tymn@asm.ca.gov; ca05tm.outreach@mail.house.gov;
repkevinkiley@mail8.housecommunications.gov; tomlozmcc@comcast.net;
repvincefong@mail8.housecommunications.gov; repobernolte@mail8.housecommunications.gov;
senator.strickland@senate.ca.gov; assemblymember.macedo@assembly.ca.gov; rosalinda.alexander@asm.ca.gov;
carl@reformca.net; senator.grove@senate.ca.gov; katy@californiaglobe.com

Date: Friday, May 1, 2026 at 10:49 AM PDT

BILL TO AUTHORIZE CAHSRA TO CONCEAL TRUTH ABOUT FRAUD & WASTEFUL SPENDING ON SOCIALIST HSR

Dear Mr. Appleton,

CC: -d:- Mr. Broeske, Ms. Musson, Mr. Maaske; Supervisors Bredefeld & Magsig; Mr. Hilton; Councilman Karbassi; Assemblymembers Tangipa, DeMaio & Macedo; Congressmen McClintock, Kiley, Fong & Obernolte; Senators Strickland & Grove; Ms. Grimes


Please alert your listeners to the progress of this bill, AB-1008, in the Assembly, which, if enacted, would allow the CAHSRA to conceal adverse information, e.g., fraud, waste and abuse, about the Supermassive Black Hole Bullet Train.

Like transit agencies concealing the truth about their insolvency by using "off-book account," omitting their capital and fixed costs, like Enron did, like Bernie Madoff did. While motorists are paying intolerable gas taxes, which are being diverted to fund socialist public sector transit boondoggles like FAX-FUX-FNO, VTA, TAMC, SCCRTC, SBCCOG, COGs all over California so that empty and nearly empty bus seats can be transported by grossly overpaid public sector union employees SEIU, etc.

If CAHSRA can legally conceal fraud, waste and abuse by our government, wasting our tax dollars, then what next? Will all agencies in California government be permitted to hide the truth about their theft of our tax dollars? Nothing happened to EDD after their disgraceful, shameful waste and fraud of our tax dollars during Covid. Is that going to become standard operating procedure in California?

Joe Thompson
Fresno, CA 93711 in Mr. McClintock's District
(408) 607-7351 cell phone


----- Forwarded Message -----
From: LegiScan Alerts <alerts@legiscan.com>
To: "translaw@pacbell.net" <translaw@pacbell.net>



Sent: Monday, April 27, 2026 at 7:56:41 AM PDT
Subject: Legiscan Monitoring

Legiscan Monitoring Report


Weekly Summary

April 27, 2026



State	Bill #	Summary	Status
CA	AB1608	Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail. <i>Changes: Committee Activity, History Steps, New Vote</i>	2026-04-23 / Intro Read second time. Ordered to third reading.

You have received this email because of the [Alerts](#) you have set up.
If you want to stop receiving these updates please login to your account and disable alerts.



Joseph P Thompson
416 W Audubon Dr
Fresno CA 93711-6893

CA AB1608 | 2025-2026 | Regular Session California Assembly Bill 1608

Status

Sponsorship: Partisan Bill (Democrat 1)
Status: Introduced on January 20 2026 - 25% progression
Action: 2026-04-23 - Read second time. Ordered to third reading.
Text: Latest bill text (Amended) [HTML]

Summary

An act to amend Section 39719.3 of the Health and Safety Code, and to amend Sections 187010, 187020, 187024, 187034, and 187038 of, to amend the heading of Division 19.7 (commencing with Section 187000) of, to amend the headings of Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 187020) and Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 187030) of Division 19.7 of, and to add Sections 187026, 187035, and 187037 to, the Public Utilities Code, relating to transportation.

Title

Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail.

Sponsors

Asm. Lori Wilson [D]

Roll Calls

- 2026-04-22 - *Assembly* - Do pass (Y: 9 N: 4 NV: 0 Abs: 2) [PASS]
- 2026-04-07 - *Assembly* - Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] (Y: 9 N: 3 NV: 0 Abs: 0) [PASS]
- 2026-03-23 - *Assembly* - Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Judiciary] (Y: 12 N: 4 NV: 0 Abs: 0) [PASS]

History

Date	Chamber	Action
2026-04-23	Assembly	Read second time. Ordered to third reading.
2026-04-22	Assembly	From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 9. Noes 4.) (April 22).
2026-04-08	Assembly	From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 9. Noes 3.) (April 7). Re-referred to Com. on APPR.
2026-03-24	Assembly	From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on JUD. (Ayes 12. Noes 4.) (March 23). Re-referred to Com. on JUD.
2026-03-11	Assembly	Re-referred to Com. on TRANS.
2026-03-10	Assembly	From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on TRANS. Read second time and amended.
2026-02-17	Assembly	Referred to Coms. on TRANS. and JUD.
2026-01-21	Assembly	From printer. May be heard in committee February 20.
2026-01-20	Assembly	Read first time. To print.

Code Citations

Chapter	Section	Citation Type	Statute Text
Health and Safety Code	39719.3	Amended Code	Citation Text
Public Utilities Code	187010	Amended Code	Citation Text

Chapter	Section	Citation Type	Statute Text
Public Utilities Code	187020	Amended Code	Citation Text
Public Utilities Code	187024	Amended Code	Citation Text
Public Utilities Code	187026	New Code	See Bill Text
Public Utilities Code	187034	Amended Code	Citation Text
Public Utilities Code	187035	New Code	See Bill Text
Public Utilities Code	187037	New Code	See Bill Text
Public Utilities Code	187038	Amended Code	Citation Text

California State Sources

Type	Source
Summary	https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1608
Text	https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1608#99INT
Text	https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1608#98AMD
Roll Call	https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1608



Bill Text: CA AB1608 | 2025-2026 | Regular Session | Amended California Assembly Bill 1608

Bill Title: Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail.

Sponsorship: Partisan Bill (Democrat 1)

Status: (Introduced) 2026-04-23 - Read second time. Ordered to third reading. [AB1608 Detail]

Download: California-2025-AB1608-Amended.html

AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY MARCH 10, 2026

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE— 2025–2026 REGULAR SESSION

ASSEMBLY BILL

NO. 1608

Introduced by Assembly Member Wilson

January 20, 2026

An act to amend Section 39719.3 of the Health and Safety Code, and to amend Sections 187010, 187020, 187024, 187034, and 187038 of, to amend the heading of Division 19.7 (commencing with Section 187000) of, to amend the headings of Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 187020) and Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 187030) of Division 19.7 of, and to add Sections 187026, 187035, and 187037 to, the Public Utilities Code, relating to transportation.

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 1608, as amended, Wilson. Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail.

Existing law creates the High-Speed Rail Authority to develop and implement a high-speed rail system in the state. Existing law creates the High-Speed Rail Authority Office of the Inspector General and authorizes the High-Speed Rail Authority Inspector General to initiate an audit or review regarding oversight related to delivery of the high-speed rail project undertaken by the authority and the selection and oversight of contractors related to that project. Existing law authorizes the Inspector General to select, appoint, and employ officers and employees necessary to carry out the functions of the office, as specified.

This bill would rename the office as the Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail and revise the title of the Inspector General as the Inspector General of the High-Speed Rail.

This bill would authorize the Inspector General to adopt and make use of the classifications, associated salary ranges, and other forms of compensation established or otherwise used by other state agencies identified by the Inspector General as performing comparable oversight work, as specified.

This bill would authorize the Inspector General to contract for goods and services that the Inspector General deems necessary for the furtherance of the purposes of the office. For a contract up to \$1,000,000 in value, the bill would exempt the Inspector General from all contract requirements of the Public Contract Code that require oversight, review, or approval by the Department of General Services or any other state agency.

This bill would require the Inspector General, upon completion of an audit or review, to publish a complete report on its internet website, provide notification of the published report to the Governor and the High-Speed Rail Authority, and submit a copy of the report to the Legislature. The bill would ~~authorize the Inspector General from publishing that report publicly available to hold that report, or a portion of that report, confidential, as specified, if the Inspector General determines that the report report, or portion of the~~

report, would describe or otherwise reveal weaknesses that would pose a substantial and identifiable risk to the project or to state operations if publicly disclosed. If the Inspector General makes that determination, the bill would require the Inspector General, among other things, to deliver a confidential report to state officials with oversight of the project, as specified.

This bill would require all books, papers, records, and correspondence of the office to be public records subject to the California Public Records Act, but would prohibit the Inspector General or the employees of the Inspector General from releasing certain types of records to the public, except under specified circumstances. The bill would prohibit the Inspector General from destroying any papers or memoranda used to support a completed audit or review sooner than 3 years after the corresponding report is published or delivered, as specified.

Existing law authorizes the Inspector General to access certain records and property and requires an officer or employee of any agency or entity having those records or property in their possession or under their control to permit access to, and examination and reproduction of those records or property, upon the request of the Inspector General, as specified.

This bill would specify that providing confidential information to the Inspector General under these circumstances does not constitute a waiver of that confidentiality.

Existing law requires the Inspector General to report at least annually to the Legislature and the Governor a summary of its findings of any reviews, investigations, or audits, when the High-Speed Rail Authority provides statutorily required documents to the Legislature, and upon request of the Legislature or Governor.

This bill would instead require the Inspector General to report at least annually to the Legislature and the Governor a summary of its findings of any reviews, investigations, or audits published pursuant to the above-described provisions at the beginning of each fiscal year and upon request of the Legislature or Governor.

Existing constitutional provisions require that a statute that limits the right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.

This bill would make legislative findings to that effect.

Digest Key

Vote: majority Appropriation: no Fiscal Committee: yes Local Program: no

Bill Text

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. (a) The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:

- (1) Timely, independent oversight of the high-speed rail project is critical to both the success of the project and to ensuring that public funds used on the project are spent efficiently and effectively.
- (2) The Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail was created to fulfill this role.
- (3) It is necessary for the Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail to be independent in its design and operation so that delays in acquisition, or increased costs, related to personnel, goods, and services do not impair its ability to fulfill its mission.

(b) For the reasons stated in subdivision (a), it is the intent of the Legislature that the Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail has the ability to operate independently of other state agencies when publishing reports, making hiring decisions, and entering into contracts with a value of up to \$1,000,000.

SEC. 2. Section 39719.3 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read:

39719.3. (a) For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:

- (1) "Fully funded" means the High-Speed Rail Authority has secured funding to complete the Merced to Bakersfield segment within the timelines identified in the most recent business plan prepared pursuant to Section 185033 of the Public Utilities Code or project update report prepared pursuant to Section 185033.5 of the Public Utilities Code and the Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail has confirmed that the High-Speed Rail Authority has secured that funding.
- (2) "Merced to Bakersfield segment" means a 171-mile electrified dual-track segment that is usable for high-speed rail service in the central valley from Merced to Bakersfield, with a new combined station in downtown Merced, and connections to the Amtrak San Joaquins and the Altamont Corridor Express.

(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of Section 39719 and or paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 39719.4, beginning with the 2022-23 fiscal year, it is the intent of the Legislature that the High-Speed Rail Authority prioritize use of the funds provided pursuant to Section 39719 or Section 39719.4 to complete the Merced to Bakersfield segment.

(c) Beginning with the 2022 legislative year, the High-Speed Rail Authority shall not enter into new funding commitments with funds provided pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of Section 39719.4 or paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 39719.4 for activities outside the Merced to Bakersfield segment, except for the following purposes:

- (1) Completion of environmental study activities and planning activities required by federal grant agreements or other existing agreements.
- (2) State operations activities related to construction management and project development and enterprisewide capital expenditures.
- (3) (A) Additional activities, not to cumulatively exceed five hundred million dollars (\$500,000,000), that maximize the efficiency of delivering the project, excluding paragraphs (1) and (2).

(B) The High-Speed Rail Authority shall provide advance notification of work described in subparagraph (A) to the Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail (OIG) and the chairs of the relevant committees of both houses of the Legislature. The OIG shall conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed work outside the Merced to Bakersfield segment within 60 days of notification and make a finding as to whether or not expenditure of funds for the proposed work will result in a delay in the completion of the Merced to Bakersfield segment. After that time, the OIG shall provide its analysis to chairpersons of the committees of both houses of the Legislature that consider appropriations and the chairpersons of the committees and the appropriate subcommittees of both houses of the Legislature that consider the State Budget before contracts for projects outside of the Merced to Bakersfield segment are considered by the High-Speed Rail Authority for approval.

(C) Before expenditure of funds pursuant to this paragraph, the High-Speed Rail Authority shall provide notification of grant applications to the chairpersons of the committees of both houses of the Legislature that consider appropriations and the chairpersons of the committees and the appropriate subcommittees of both houses of the Legislature that consider the State Budget. Approval of the grant application by the Department of Finance may be authorized no sooner than 30 days after notification in writing to the chairpersons of the committees in each house of the Legislature that consider appropriations and the chairpersons of the committees and the appropriate subcommittees in each house of the Legislature that consider the State Budget.

(d) (1) This section shall become inoperative on June 30, 2030, or when the Merced to Bakersfield segment is fully funded, whichever is sooner, and shall be repealed on January 1 of the following year.

(2) The High-Speed Rail Authority shall inform the Legislature when the Merced to Bakersfield segment is fully funded in compliance with Section 9795 of the Government Code.

SEC. 3. The heading of Division 19.7 (commencing with Section 187000) of the Public Utilities Code is amended to read:

DIVISION 19.7. Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail

SEC. 4. Section 187010 of the Public Utilities Code is amended to read:

187010. Unless the context requires otherwise, for purposes of this division, the following definitions apply:

- (a) "Inspector General" means the Inspector General of the High-Speed Rail appointed pursuant to Section 187020.
- (b) "Merced to Bakersfield segment" means a 171-mile electrified dual-track segment that is usable for high-speed rail service in the central valley from Merced to Bakersfield, with a new combined station in downtown Merced, and connections to the Amtrak San Joaquins and the Altamont Corridor Express.
- (c) "Office" means the Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail established pursuant to Section 187020.
- (d) "Personnel issues" means matters specific to the employment relationship between the High-Speed Rail Authority and its employees, including, but not limited to, hiring and promotional decisions, performance reviews, progressive discipline, adverse actions, grievances, merit issue complaints, workplace harassment, discrimination, or possible wage or supply theft having an immaterial effect, as determined by the Inspector General, on the planning, delivery, and operation of the project. For purposes of this division, "personnel issues" does not mean fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement by the High-Speed Rail Authority or its employees having a material effect, as determined by the Inspector General, on the planning, delivery, and operation of the project.

(e) "Project" means the high-speed rail project undertaken by the High-Speed Rail Authority pursuant to Division 19 (commencing with Section 185000) of this code and Chapter 20 (commencing with Section 2704) and Chapter 20.5 (commencing with Section 2704.75) of Division 3 of the Streets and Highways Code.

SEC. 5. The heading of Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 187020) of Division 19.7 of the Public Utilities Code is amended to read:

CHAPTER 2. Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail

SEC. 6. Section 187020 of the Public Utilities Code is amended to read:

187020. (a) (1) There is hereby created the Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail.

(2) The Governor shall appoint the Inspector General of the High-Speed Rail to a four-year term from a list of three qualified individuals nominated by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. The Joint Legislative Audit Committee shall select the three qualified

individuals from a pool of candidates, including a comprehensive search for qualified individuals. The Joint Legislative Audit Committee shall provide at least 120 days notice that it is seeking applicants for nomination by providing notice in the Journals of the Senate and the Assembly and by advertising in appropriate newspapers and both nationally acknowledged professional journals and associations. Names for consideration by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee may be submitted by members of the Legislature, professional organizations, individuals, and other entities. The Inspector General shall be chosen without reference to party affiliation and solely on the ground of merit to perform the duties of the Inspector General of the High-Speed Rail.

(3) The Legislature and the Governor may provide suggested qualifications to the Joint Legislative Audit Committee to consider when making its nominations.

(b) The office shall not be a subdivision of any other governmental entity.

(c) The Inspector General may not be removed from office by the Governor during that term, except for good cause.

SEC. 7. Section 187024 of the Public Utilities Code is amended to read:

187024. (a) Subject to applicable law, the Inspector General shall select, appoint, and employ officers and employees necessary to carry out the functions of the office. In making these selections, the Inspector General shall ensure that those officers and employees have the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out their duties effectively.

(b) To recruit and retain qualified officers and employees with the relatively higher level of education, expertise, knowledge, and ability necessary to perform time-sensitive, technically complex reviews of the project, the Inspector General may, notwithstanding any other law, adopt and make use of the classifications, associated salary ranges, and other forms of compensation established or otherwise used by other state agencies identified by the Inspector General as performing comparable oversight work, so long as the Inspector General determines that any individual to be hired meets or exceeds applicable eligibility requirements and minimum qualifications.

SEC. 8. Section 187026 is added to the Public Utilities Code, to read:

187026. (a) The Inspector General may contract for goods and services that the Inspector General deems necessary for the furtherance of the purposes of the office.

(b) For a contract up to one million dollars (\$1,000,000) in value, the Inspector General shall be exempt from all contract requirements of the Public Contract Code that require oversight, review, or approval by the Department of General Services or any other state agency.

SEC. 9. The heading of Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 187030) of Division 19.7 of the Public Utilities Code is amended to read:

CHAPTER 3. Responsibilities of the Inspector General of the High-Speed Rail

SEC. 10. Section 187034 of the Public Utilities Code is amended to read:

187034. (a) Notwithstanding any other law, the Inspector General during regular business hours or at any other time determined necessary by the Inspector General shall have access to and authority to examine and reproduce any and all books, accounts, reports, vouchers, correspondence, files, documents, and other records, and to examine the bank accounts, money, or other property of the High-Speed Rail Authority in connection with duties authorized by this division. Any officer or employee of any agency or entity having these records or property in their possession or under their control shall permit access to, and examination and reproduction thereof consistent with the provisions of this division, upon the request of the Inspector General or the Inspector General's authorized representative.

(b) The High-Speed Rail Authority shall ensure that the right-of-access provisions described in subdivision (a) are included in all of its contracts or amendments executed on or after July 1, 2024, in which project funds will be expended.

(c) *Providing confidential information to the Inspector General pursuant to this section, including, but not limited to, confidential information that is subject to discovery, shall not constitute a waiver of that confidentiality.*

~~SEC. 10.~~ **SEC. 11.** Section 187035 is added to the Public Utilities Code, to read:

187035. (a) The Inspector General shall not destroy any papers or memoranda used to support a completed audit or review sooner than three years after the corresponding report is published or delivered pursuant to Section 187037.

(b) All books, papers, records, and correspondence of the office pertaining to its work are public records subject to Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1 of the Government Code and shall be filed at any of the regularly maintained offices of the Inspector General, except that none of the following items or papers of which those items are a part shall be released to the public by the Inspector General or the employees of the Inspector General:

(1) Personal papers and correspondence of any person providing assistance to the Inspector General for purposes of paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 187032 when that person has requested in writing that their papers and correspondence be kept private and confidential. ~~Those~~ Consistent with subdivision (A) of paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 187032, those papers and correspondence shall become public records if the written request is withdrawn or upon the order of the Inspector General.

(2) Papers, correspondence, memoranda, or any substantive information pertaining to any audit or review not completed.

(b) Notwithstanding Section 18703 of the Government Code, the Inspector General shall report annually to the Legislature and the Governor on findings related to the High-Speed Rail Authority's planning and delivery of the project. This report shall include updates on the High-Speed Rail Authority's efforts to remedy any identified findings, and whether any identified findings have been addressed.

(c) The Inspector General shall maintain a list of identified findings and the status of the High-Speed Rail Authority's efforts to address them, and shall post that list on the Internet or other website.

(d) Reports to be submitted to the Legislature pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b) shall be submitted in compliance with Section 9795 of the Government Code.

~~SEC. 14.~~ **SEC. 14.** The Legislature finds and declares that Sections 19 and 11 and 12 of this act, which add Sections 187035 and 187037 to the Public Utilities Code, impose a limitation on the public's right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies within the meaning of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution. Pursuant to that constitutional provision, the Legislature makes the following findings to demonstrate the interest protected by this limitation and the need for protecting that interest:

Keeping certain records and reports of the Office of the Inspector General, High-Speed Rail confidential is necessary to enable the Inspector General to fully conduct audits and investigations and may be necessary, under certain circumstances, to ensure the security of the high-speed rail project. Under these circumstances, keeping these records and reports confidential outweighs the interest in public disclosure of the information contained in these records and reports.

CA High-Speed Rail Cost Explodes to \$231 Billion, From Original \$33 Billion

californiaglobe.com/ff/high-speed-rail-cost-explodes-to-231-billion-from-original-33-billion/

Katy Grimes

April 26, 2026

'Our country has never seen a fiscal disaster of this magnitude'

From: Joseph Patrick Thompson

Date: April 29, 2026 at 12:10 am

To: California Globe "CA High-Speed Rail Cost Explodes to \$231 Billion from Original \$33B"

Friends,

If the suggestion box is open. Put CAHSRA in Ch. 9. Do a liquidating plan of reorganization. Trade the partially completed infrastructure to the Class Ones in exchange for restoration of intermodal facilities in all ag-shipping Counties.

Auction off everything else.

Have the Trustee seek clawback of fraudulent transfers; he gets an extra two years on the Statute of Limitations courtesy of the Bankruptcy Code.

The additional TOFC & COFC revenue for the Class Ones offsets the losses moving passengers.

You'd have less traffic congestion on I-5 & Hwy. 99; fewer accidents, injuries & fatalities; cleaner air; less road surface and bridge support deterioration.

UP is seeking approval for its merger with NS; "the public interest" is a condition precedent to Surf-Board approval.

Public interest in the governing statute, 49 USC 11324(c) is not limited to the express conditions in the Section.

AB-377 (Tangipa) was no solution.


Rather than hang Stonehenge II around the necks of future generations, lets switch HSR to the private sector promised by Prop. 1A.

Joe Thompson

(408) 607-7351;

TransLaw@PacBell.Net





Train wreck. (Photo: public domain)

California's High-Speed Rail boondoggle is now estimated to cost taxpayers \$231 billion, up from its original \$33.5 billion price tag in 2008 when voters passed Proposition 1A.

"Our country has never seen a fiscal disaster of this magnitude," California Rep. Kevin Kiley said on X Monday.

Voters were deceived by the original ballot summary and language in Proposition 1A from 2008, but the state's lawmakers seem to find that fact inconvenient.

And, the entire project is lacking in private, public and debt funding to complete even the most minor operating segment – nearly 20 years later.

“If it is built, California’s High-Speed Rail would be the largest public works project in state history. That fact alone appears to be intoxicating to state officials, in a perpetual quest to have California be the first state to do anything,” **I reported in 2011**. That's how long California's High Speed Rail has served only as a jobs program and a really bad joke on California voters and taxpayers.

“Even though high-speed rail has become nothing more than a pipeline project for grabbing big money and a big lie, Gov. Jerry Brown signed a rail bill Wednesday, sealing California's economic fate. Because of the illegitimacy of the project's intent, California taxpayers will be left holding the bill.”

I wrote that in 2012. Since then, the only thing that has changed is California Governor Gavin Newsom is now responsible for this High Speed Swindle.

The bill Brown signed in 2012 authorized \$5.8 billion to start construction of only one high-speed rail line in the Central Valley, and included \$2.6 billion in state rail bond funds, along with \$3.2 billion in federal funds.

“But California will have to borrow every dime of that state money to build the high-speed boondoggle.”

“And that's the only federal funding the state will receive for the entire \$68-\$135 billion project. The newest revised business plan claims to have reduced the cost of the project to \$68 billion from \$98.6 billion by expanding the 130-mile line from Fresno to Bakersfield, to Merced to San Fernando Valley, for a 300-mile segment. But many economists and rail experts project that the project could cost as much as \$135 billion.”

This could have been written today but it wasn't – this also is from 2012.

As I wrote in 2013 about High Speed Rail:

“In July 2012, the Legislature and Gov. Jerry Brown passed legislation to approve the first \$6 billion segment of high-speed rail tracks. This first segment starts with a \$1.5 billion leg from Madera to Fresno in the Central Valley.

During Assembly and Senate floor debates and speeches, Democrats repeatedly said, “This is our moment.” They talked of the significance of voting for the biggest infrastructure project in California history. And they blathered incessantly of their own importance in voting for the project.

Republican Assemblywoman Diane Harkey of Dana Point warned of dire economic circumstances. "Gov. Brown and many Sacramento Democrats seem unable to set priorities even though the state is bankrupt, boasts the lowest credit rating in the nation, must borrow \$10 billion for short-term cash flow needs, while cutting public safety dollars and practicing 'catch and release' for state prisoners," Harkey said. "We rank near the bottom of the 50 states in public education achievement and the Sacramento solution is to realign that function and implement trigger cuts IF voters don't agree to raise taxes in November. But, billions in debt funding for one hundred miles of track with no train, no ridership and no cost analysis is still on the table."

Senator Tony Strickland posted to X Monday:

As I prepare for the Senate Transportation Committee hearing later today to discuss the California High Speed Rail Authority's 2026 draft Business Plan, here are my thoughts. The nonpartisan LAO points out that the CHSRA has arbitrarily changed the scope of the program and costs, ignores specific requirements that the California State Legislature has imposed on the project, assumes significant changes in state law, and once again, dramatically changes cost estimates. Even if the Authority accounts for these requirements, it still lacks a clear funding plan to complete the project. The San Francisco–Los Angeles line is now estimated at \$231 billion! Overall, the Authority has produced a completely unrealistic business plan. This is why we need to pull the plug on this wasteful spending project because it will go down as the worst public project in world history. Even Lou Thompson, former chair of the CHSRA Peer Review Group, agreed & wrote a critical letter to legislative leadership, stating that this project has reached a dead end.

Lou Thompson's letter:

2026 Lou Thompson HSR Scathing Letter to CA Leadership

In 2019, thousands of pages of public records were removed from the California High Speed Rail Authority website. Members of the media and anyone seeking information about rail authority spending are only able to access previously posted documents like detailed information on every project change order, board meeting materials and historical business plans, through a time consuming and unreliable California Public Records Act request according to the Rail Authority website.

The California State Auditor uncovered rail employees, contractors and consultants with wild conflicts of interest. Then-auditor Elaine Howle allowed the title of the audit to speak for itself: "California High-Speed Rail Authority: Its Flawed Decision Making and Poor Contract Management Have Contributed to Billions in Cost Overruns and Delays in the System's Construction."

The warnings about this epic swindle of taxpayers have been there since its inception, but this has been done with the complicity of the California Legislature and Governors Jerry Brown and Gavin Newsom.

If you thought the high speed rail swindle was going nowhere after 18 years of taxpayer funding without an operational train, it should be clear by now that High Speed Rail really serves no other purpose other than to provide jobs and salaries to green totalitarians, labor unions and consultants, courtesy of the California taxpayers.

What a swindle.

What Voters Approved in 2008

California voters approved **Proposition 1A in 2008**, the "Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act for the 21st Century." Here are some details:

* **\$33.5 billion cost.** They approved a total cost of \$33.5 billion for a high-speed rail system. The \$33.5 billion was to be made up of a combination of 1/3 federal funds, 1/3 state funds and 1/3 private funds. Importantly, the investment from California taxpayers was limited to a \$9.95 billion bond.


* **S.F. to L.A.** Voters approved a system connecting San Francisco to Los Angeles, with a trip time of two hours and 40 minutes, at a cost of \$55 per ticket. But the plan has veered sharply inland from San Francisco to Los Angeles, over to the Central Valley, with a leg from Fresno to Bakersfield. And the cost of the trip jumped to \$105.

* **Ridership: 95 million.** Even ridership numbers have been toyed with. Voters were told that there would be a ridership of 95 million passengers by 2030. Ridership estimates have decreased nearly three times since 2008, and they are still absurdly inflated. In the new report, they're estimated to be as high as 36 million passengers by 2060 (page 5-17). That's about a third of the Prop. 1A promise.

* **Bond repayment.** Repaying high-speed rail bonds will cost the state's General Fund \$647 million per year for 30 years, or approximately \$20 billion for the \$9.95 billion bond.

This is a cartoon created by cartoonist Ross Mayfield, after I called the High Speed Rail segment from Bakersfield to Madera "the Conjugal Express."

COME ON JERRY! I THOUGHT YOU SAID THIS THING
WAS SUPPOSED TO BE HIGH-SPEED!
VISITING HOURS AT THE PRISON ARE OVER AT 3!



©RLMMMXIII

JERRY BROWN'S High Speed Rail:
CONJUGAL EXPRESS

The Conjugal Express, by Ross Mayfield.




Katy Grimes, the Editor in Chief of the California Globe, is a long-time Investigative Journalist covering the California State Capitol, the co-author of California's War Against Donald Trump: Who Wins? Who Loses? and a contributor to "Taxifornia 2016." A California native and Navy mom, Katy lives in Sacramento, CA.



Letter: Taxpayers cannot afford a transportation boondoggle

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON June 12, 2025

LETTER TO THE EDITOR



Open letter to Hon. Sean Duffy, U.S. Secretary of Transportation.

Re: USDOT F.R.A.'s Notice of Proposed Determination 6-4-2025

In my opinion, the reason for the failure of the CAHSRA's high speed rail proposal is its reliance on the public sector model of transport funding as seen in the nation's history with Amtrak and other public sector transit boondoggles.

Despite "efficiency" appearing four times in the national transportation policy, long before creation of a federal department of governmental efficiency, in practice we seem dependent on taxpayer funded forms of transit to the detriment of the taxpayers, e.g., motorists paying gas taxes, who are expected by the government to pay 102% of our transport costs.

Over the decades, state and federal transport funding experts have recommended that we fund our transport with user fees, that is, fares by the patrons. The Highway Trust Fund has been diverted to subsidize public sector transit systems. So, we don't even follow our own experts' advice for transport funding.

In 1970, during debate on creation of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), congressmen stood on the floor in the House and proclaimed, "It will be self-sufficient in three years."

By Sept. 11, 2001, when the terrorists took down the World Trade Centers, Amtrak's subsidies, in a stack of \$100 bills, were taller than the World Trade Centers had stood, as reported by Traffic World. Today, Amtrak's subsidies would make Lenin blush.

In 1920, we enacted the Transportation Act and reversed the nationalization of the railroads that had been done by the Wilson Administration during WW1. Why? Private sector rail was, and is, far superior to socialist rail. Today, our Class Ones are the envy of the world.

In my opinion, we are giving the wrong answer to the late honorable Norman Y. Mineta, who in 1995 at the Institute at SJSU that now bears his name said, "The crucial question in transportation today is: What should government do, and what should it leave to others?"

Secretary Mineta was right then; and he's right today. God bless his soul.

As I said to HSRC before it became an "authority," if we put enough UPS, Fedex and Postal Service tonnage on the High Speed Rail, then we would not need to ask the taxpayers for a dime.

We ought to learn from our history. Wells Fargo added U.S. Mail and bullion to their passenger stage coaches to offset their losses moving passengers.

We filled the bellies of the jumbo jets with high value freight and U.S. Mail to make those flights more profitable. Even the land grant railroads added Railway Express Agency freight to cars added to their passenger trains to make those runs profitable.

The north-south tonnage flows on I-5, US-101, and CA-99 have sufficient volumes that, if diverted to TOFC & COFC intermodal service, we could offset the losses of moving passengers-only HSR in California.

I sent Secretary Duffy a copy of Granville Dodge's "How We Built the Transcontinental Railway," in which Congressman/General Dodge relates Lincoln's rejection to his urging at the White House in 1864 that the transcontinental railroad be government owned. In my opinion, we ought to be following Lincoln's advice for the private-sector solution to the nation's transportation.

Voters in California voted in 2008 for private sector HSR. We did not vote for another Amtrak, public sector transit boondoggle.

California taxpayers cannot afford to subsidize the transit boondoggles that we already have. Let's give the right answer to Secretary Mineta's "crucial question."

Joseph P. Thompson

Fresno

JOSEPH P. THOMPSON

A THANKS FOR YOUR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF SOUND, SUSTAINABLE HSR IN CALIFORNIA

From: Joseph P Thompson (translaw@pacbell.net)

To: lou.thompson@gmail.com; tarubin@earthlink.net; teamhilton@stevehiltonforgovernor.com; reply-rbr9upqjmb-b7zhbpf5f-ncmrnca9uepmls@info.stevhiltonforgovernor.com

CC: senator.grove@senate.ca.gov; assemblymember.tangipa@outreach.assembly.ca.gov; david@davidtangipaforassembly.com; assemblymember.tangipa@assembly.ca.gov; info@davidtangipa4ca.com; ian.coolbear@asm.ca.gov; belle.castro@asm.ca.gov; emily.tymn@asm.ca.gov

Date: Saturday, May 2, 2026 at 11:39 AM PDT

Mr. Lou S. Thompson
850 Webster St. #727
Palo Alto, CA 94301

cc: Mr. Tom Rubin; Mr. Steve Hilton

Dear Mr. Thompson,

Having just read your letter dated 3-27-26 to State government leadership, including our former SBC County Supervisor when we lived in Tres Pinos, I want to thank you for your insight and your well-thought out decision regarding the status and future of high speed rail in California.

Ever since I wrote to the Honorable Quentin Kopp in 1996 (see attached letter), it has been my position that, while desirable, high speed rail is only sustainable in the private sector.

The late honorable Norman Y. Mineta said in 1995 at the annual meeting of the Institute at SJSU that now bears his name, "The crucial question in transportation today is: What should government do, and what should it leave to others.?"

As a small token of appreciation I am attaching my white paper on the National Transportation Policy,

wherein I quote Norm's "crucial question."

Private or public? A perennial question facing the Nation. In his **"How We Built the Transcontinental Railway,"** Granville Dodge recounts his meeting with the President at the White House in 1864. To

his demand that the TC RR be government owned, Lincoln said no, it must be in the private sector,

or words to that effect.

When enacting the Transportation Act of 1920, Congress effectively reversed the Wilson Administration's

nationalization of the railroads. Lady Thatcher basically did the same with British Rail.

In pre-Election debate with the Hon. Rod Diridon in 2008, I stressed the importance of a private sector solution, at the debates sponsored by the joint Gilroy & Morgan Hill Chambers of Commerce

at the Gilroy Chamber's Conference Room. I repeated my position in letters to editors, and to the HSRC and later then HSRA in response to requests for public comment. Also, I restated my position

in testimony before the Assembly Transportation Committee in 2010 in support of proposed legislation


by Diane Harkey to defund the Bullet Train. I have over the years continued to restate my position.


I recently spoke on Radio KMJ580 to Mr. Steve Hilton and Mr. Ray Appleton regarding my ideas for sound, sustainable HSR in California. Mr. Hilton voiced his approval of my ideas.


So, therefore, I thank you for your insight into the issue of sound, sustainable HSR in California, just as I have thanked Tom Rubin for his over these past years 2008-2026. In my opinion, we ought to follow Lincoln's advice to Dodge, and the wisdom seen from Congress by enactment of the Transportation Act of 1920. Warts and all, capitalism is better to build upon than the quicksand of socialism. Sustainable rail is possible when built on the bedrock of capitalism.

Sincerely,
Joe Thompson
see bio attached
Fresno, CA 93711 in Mr. Tangipa's District; in Ms. Grove's District
(408) 607--7351 cell phone



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 BIO-TRANS.pdf
46 kB

 ATLLP97.V2.pdf
1.229 kB

Louis S. Thompson
850 Webster St. #727
Palo Alto, CA 94301
lou.thompson@gmail.com

March 27, 2026

The Honorable Monique Limón
Senate President Pro Tem
1021 O Street, Suite 8518
Sacramento, CA 95814

The Honorable Robert Rivas
Speaker of the Assembly
1021 O Street, Suite 8330
Sacramento, CA 95814

The Honorable Brian Jones
Senate Republican Leader
1021 O St. Suite 7640
Sacramento, CA 95814

The Honorable Heath Flora
Assembly Republican Leader
State Capitol Building
Room 4740
Sacramento, CA 95814

Dear Honorable Members:

My name is Louis S. (Lou) Thompson. From 2009 to 2024, I was a member of the Peer Review Group reporting to the legislature on issues related to the high-speed rail project. I was Chairman from 2012 to 2024. In my letter of resignation, I again emphasized the Group's recommendations that the legislature commission an independent study of the problems experienced in the project, what to do about them, and the lessons that should be learned. Subsequent reports by the Authority – the 2025 Project Update Report, the 2025 Supplemental Project Report, and the Draft 2026 Business Plan – have underlined the urgent need for such a study, both because of the difficult situation the project faces and because of the risks the project poses to the state. The views below are my own and should not be attributed to anyone else.

In my judgement, the Draft 2026 Business Plan describes a project that has reached a dead end. Despite contrary claims, the Authority cannot complete the promised 171-mile link from Merced to Bakersfield by the end of 2032 with the funding available. The full Phase I project that the 2008 Business Plan promised would cost \$33.8 billion and yield a 2-hr 40-min trip time from San Francisco to Los Angeles is now estimated to cost \$231 billion. The Authority proposes an “optimized” plan that would cost \$126 billion, but the plan is based on questionable savings due to proposed design and sequencing changes, and on poorly described scope reductions such as leaving an unfunded gap between Gilroy and San Jose and blended operation

with Metrolink between Palmdale and Los Angeles/Anaheim, along with an unresolved delay in the Link US project at Los Angeles Union Station. All of these will have an undefined but clearly negative impact on trip times and on the project's total cost and schedule. Even accepting **all** of the assumptions on which the "optimized" system is based, the project and the state still face an unfunded gap of at least \$91 billion for which entirely new sources would have to be found. **This is not, not even remotely, the system the voters approved in Proposition 1A.**

How did this happen? What should be done about it? What are the lessons for the state? These questions should be addressed in a detailed, independent study commissioned by the legislature. In advance of that study, I would like to propose a few likely conclusions.

How did this happen?

The roots of the problem were partly baked in from the beginning and partly self-inflicted as the project developed:

- The grand "vision" of the project sold to the public in Proposition 1A was far short of any realistically achievable cost and schedule. This could have been due to naivete, "irrational exuberance," "strategic misrepresentation", short-sighted political self-promotion or, more likely, a combination of all four.
- The funding plan had three fatal flaws:
 - It was far below a reasonable estimate of the project's actual capital costs;
 - It propounded state, federal and private shares of financing that were completely unrealistic. The state share was to be a one-time bond issue of roughly one-third of the cost. The proposed federal share of roughly one-third of the cost was based on aspirations for federal programs **that did not exist then and do not exist today**. The project did benefit from minor federal financing programs and was boosted for a while by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) funding, most of which has been rescinded (twice) by the Trump Administration. It should be noted that the Authority has recently decided not to sue the Federal Railroad Administration for restoration of that funding, possibly recognizing that it does not have a convincing business case. Similarly, outreach by the Authority has shown that private investors will not make a significant contribution to project construction, but will await completion and proof of the projected demand and operating costs;
 - Probably most important, the funding has come in insufficient and unpredictable **pieces**, not a stable and adequate **flow** that would permit effective planning and management of construction over the life of the project. The recently awarded \$1 billion in annual funding from the Cap and Invest program through 2045 has helped, but it will not suffice even to complete the 171-mile Merced to Bakersfield segment by the end of 2032 as promised in the Draft 2026 Business Plan.

Given these critical problems at the outset, even the best management would have failed.

Actual commencement of the project then brought more issues to the fore.

- A decision to have "lean" state management combined with a slow state hiring process (and low state salaries) meant that there was not enough state employee oversight of the large

teams of consultants, so decisions that only state employees could make were delayed and often not fully informed.

- Inexperience and lack of expertise, and turnover of senior leadership (and changing visions and priorities caused by that turnover), at the Authority greatly hindered progress at the outset. This has only slowly and partially been rectified.
- The search for added funding led the Authority to seek and accept ARRA funding under conditions that caused (or assisted) the Authority to commit to construction far sooner than designs and real estate acquisition should have dictated. One result of this haste has been an average cost overrun of 150 percent and large schedule delays on the major construction projects awarded so far. This performance compares poorly with other large public works projects, let alone the private sector.
- Real estate acquisition has been delayed by limits on the Authority's legal power and by limited capacity of courts to process claims, contributing to the fact that current schedules on the major contracts are now two and a half times the expected schedule at contract award.
- Compliance with NEPA, and especially CEQA, has been burdensome and expensive. Because the cost of delay on a project of this size is very high, the threat of litigation by an individual or local authority can put immense pressure on the Authority to make expensive accommodations that are not central to the project's goals. The large number of local authorities and utilities that the Authority must deal with has compounded the problem.
- Oversight of the Authority by the governor's office and the legislature has not identified and dealt with problems effectively. This is despite the excellent preparatory work by legislative staff, the Legislative Analyst's Office and, more recently, the Authority's Office of the Inspector General.

What should be done about it?

There are several actions that need to be taken.

- **Above all, the Authority's and legislature's state of denial should end.** Until this happens, the downward spiral of overpromising, followed by budget problems, followed by disruptive scope reductions, followed by contractor claims, cost increases and service reductions, cannot be halted. The project began as a promise of service from San Francisco to Los Angeles. Then, in the 2014 Business Plan, it focused on connecting Los Angeles and postponed the connection to San Francisco. Next, in the 2016 Business Plan, it shifted to connecting San Francisco and postponed the connection to Los Angeles. Then, by the 2018 Business Plan, it had postponed both connections and aimed at a connection from Merced to Bakersfield leaving vague plans for a reduced service on the ends. Now, in the Draft 2026 Business Plan, even the 171-mile Merced to Bakersfield cannot be completed by the end of 2032 without access to more funding than is currently available.
- **The legislature and governor should direct the Authority to stop overreaching and reformulate the Merced to Bakersfield segment into a set of separable, achievable stages,** in order of priority, with each stage to be commenced **only** if the prior stages can clearly be completed within available funding. Suggested potential stages, in order of priority, might be:

- Complete the construction and trackwork on the 119-mile segment from Madera to Poplar Avenue with connections to the existing San Joaquin service;
- Complete the design, real estate acquisition, construction and trackwork on either the segment from Madera to Merced or the segment from Poplar Avenue to Bakersfield;
- Complete the other segment not chosen above;
- Contract for electrification;
- Contract for high-speed rolling stock.

Given the likelihood (based on ample experience) that the current cost estimates are overly optimistic, this approach might lead to postponement of any commitment to electrification and electric rolling stock unless additional financing is developed.

- **The legislature and governor should require the Authority to provide**, either in the Final 2026 Business Plan or in a supplemental document with a **scheduled** due date:
 - A detailed listing of the scope reductions, design changes and cost reductions involved in the \$105.1 billion “optimization” that reduced the proposed cost from \$231.3 billion to \$126.2 billion;
 - A specific description of the Authority’s plans for filling the gap between Gilroy and San Jose along with agreement from the state and involved regional agencies on roles, responsibilities and funding for the actions needed to act to fill the gap;
 - A completed agreement among the state, San Joaquin Joint Powers Authority and the Authority as to operating and funding roles on the Merced to Bakersfield segment;
 - A detailed description of the Authority’s plans south of Palmdale including agreements with Metrolink covering electrification of Metrolink lines, blended operations and LA Metro’s plans to complete the Link US project;
 - A link-by-link specification of trip times expected in the “optimized” system.
- Most important, the Authority now says that it will cost \$34.8 billion to complete the “optimized” segment from Merced to Bakersfield. The state therefore faces a gap of at least \$91.4 billion to complete an “optimized” Phase I system that would have reduced performance, and a gap of \$196.5 billion to complete the full Phase I buildout as originally planned. It is increasingly critical to decide whether the state wants to stop at some version of Merced to Bakersfield within existing finances or wants to plan for extension outside the Central Valley. **The legislature and governor should urgently address the question of whether the system is to be extended beyond Merced to Bakersfield, what the extension would look like, and how the \$91 billion to \$196 billion gaps will be addressed.**

What are the lessons for the state?

High-speed rail is not the first mega-project undertaken by the state and it will surely not be the last. Mega-projects are distinct in many respects, but there are general lessons.

- Mega-projects tend to be doomed from the beginning by poor definition of scope and objectives, poor cost and schedule estimates, and over optimism about the difficulty of the project. These are often boosted by people with no “skin in the game” or with a vested interest in making the project go ahead whether or not a justifiable basis exists. Once a project actually commences, political pressures from short-term beneficiaries – consultants, construction contractors and labor unions -- intensify, so efforts to support careful planning and evaluation by **independent** agents to assess the objectives and costs of the project before

it is committed are always a good idea. California is very fortunate to have universities that can lead such independent evaluations.

- Very few mega-projects are adequately funded at the beginning, and even fewer are funded by an appropriate **flow** of funding that both matches the timing of construction outlays and permits adjustments (usually extensions) in total funding when that becomes necessary. This was a particularly destructive problem for the high-speed rail project. Multi-year projects must be accompanied by multi-year funding that is adequate, predictable, and stable; without this, effective project management is impossible. If a project cannot be funded the right way, that is a clear signal that the project should not be started.
- It is always a mistake to start projects with an imbalance between public employees and consultants. State hiring requirements impose constraints on hiring and on-boarding appropriate staff, and this can impose significant hidden costs on projects. Also, management of the project by a separated Authority, created *de novo*, denied the project the benefit of expertise and expertise of existing state agencies, such as Caltrans. This may have made acquisition of real estate and initial contract management more difficult, and it may also have made oversight by the legislature and governor's office more difficult.
- By the same token, insufficient oversight can delay full and timely recognition of problems with a project's cost, schedule or eventual performance. In the high-speed rail project, the legislature and the governor had ample information from staff, the Legislative Analyst's Office, the Peer Review Group and, later, the Authority's Office of the Inspector General to assess the project's progress, or lack thereof. It is difficult to reconcile the limited oversight with the high risks that the high-speed rail project poses to the state.
- Delays in acquisition of real estate, development of utility relocation agreements, and agreement on access to railroad rights of way imposed (and are still imposing) major costs and delays on the project, particularly as it related to lack of court capacity to adjudicate disputes. Constitutional rights must of course be respected, and negotiation is always the first resort, but finality within reasonable time is also critical, and more court capacity would help.
- Compliance with NEPA was burdensome, but the eventual transfer of NEPA compliance responsibility from the Federal Railroad Administration to the Authority was constructive.
- Threats of litigation increased the ability of local authorities to force the Authority to change plans or add features in order to avoid delays. Enhanced court processing capacity for litigation issues would be helpful. This should not mean that project managers could ride roughshod over local interests; rather, it should mean that issues are fully identified and fairly adjudicated expeditiously.

I very much hope that this letter can contribute to getting the project the revised direction it so badly needs. I would be happy to answer any questions or provide further information if that would be helpful.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Louis S. Thompson". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Louis S. Thompson

cc: Gabriel Petek, State Legislative Analyst
Samuel Assefa, Director, Governor's Office of Planning and Research
Tom Richards, Chairman, California High-Speed Rail Authority
Ian Choudri, Chief Executive Officer, California High-Speed Rail Authority
Ben Belknap, Inspector General, California High-Speed Rail Authority
Members, California High-Speed Rail Peer Review Group

ALL SUPERVISORS: —

Fw: A THANKS FOR YOUR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF SOUND, SUSTAINABLE HSR IN CALIFORNIA

Public Comment —

Joseph P Thompson (translaw@pacbell.net)

Item 11
5/12/2026 BOS Meeting

echalhoub@weeklys.com; speaker.rivas@assembly.ca.gov; carl@reformca.net;
assemblymember.macedo@assembly.ca.gov; assemblymember.tangipa@outreach.assembly.ca.gov;
david@davidtangipaforassembly.com; assemblymember.tangipa@assembly.ca.gov; info@davidtangipa4ca.com;
teamhilton@stevehiltonforgovernor.com; reply-rbr9upqjmb-cwjqc8qvbe-
ncryrcepikglls@info.stevhiltonforgovernor.com; jon@hjta.org; sbcsuper@supervisor.co.san-benito.ca.us;
supervisorkosmicki@cosb.us; info@reformcalifornia.org; info@kmjnow.com; info@sanbenitocog.org;
katy@californiaglobe.com; allcouncilmembers@ci.gilroy.ca.us; mark.turner@morganhill.ca.gov;
cityclerk@hollister.ca.gov; senator.strickland@senate.ca.gov; senator.grove@senate.ca.gov;
mike.karbassi@fresno.gov; info@garrybredefeld.com; nathan@nathanmag

Date: Wednesday, May 6, 2026 at 09:59 AM PDT



**AB-1608 PASSES: NO MORE TRUTH-IN-TRANSPORTATION?
PUBLIC COMMENT: NEXT MEETING, REGULAR OR
SPECIAL, STUDY SESSION
OR PUBLIC WORKSHOP**

Dear Editor,

While practicing law there for more then 35 years, serving on SBCCOG's Citizens Transit Task Force, and its Citizens Rail Advisory Committee, long before the current Speaker became one of SBC's Supervisors, I've written, and you and your predecessors have published (*Dispatch, Freelance & Times*) letters and Guest Editorials about truth-in-transportation, exposing fraud, waste and abuse at SBCCOG & VTA, etc., etc.

If reports about passage of AB-1608 are correct, then we may need to re-think our work exposing the truth about socialist public sector transit. Reporting such truth about insolvency, from conception, thru birth, into operations, bankrupt but kept running by



CLERK, BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

ever-increasing taxpayer's subsidies, may become a thing of the past. No more letters and articles about the losses sustained with socialist transit. A victory for the Ministry of Truth? Motorists will pay higher gas, truckers will pay higher diesel, prices so that empty bus seat transport can continue on local streets and highways, and this kind of law will silence any protests about transit wastefulness. We'll have California Newspeak instead.

Since the Legislature, and the local transit agencies, publish reports showing the bankruptcy, insolvency, and unsustainable carriage of passengers business being conducted by the government, then they too will run the risk of violating the gag law that prohibits such truth from being published. Here attached are a few examples reports about transit losses that will no longer be legal to publish;

If this new law stands-up to First Amendment challenges.

Caveat viator.

Joe Thompson

(408) 607--7351 cell phone

Charter Member, SBCCOG Citizens Transit Task Force

Charter Member, SBCCOG Citizens Rail Advisory Committee

Past-Chair, Legislation Committee, Transportation Lawyers Assn.



----- Forwarded Message -----

From: Lou Thompson <lou.thompson@gmail.com>

To: Joseph P Thompson <tranlaw@pacbell.net>

Cc: Tom Rubin <tarubin@earthlink.net>; Steve Hilton <teamhilton@stevehiltonforgovernor.com>; Team Hilton <reply-ibr9upqjmb-b7zhbpld5f-ncmrca9uepmls@info.stevhiltonforgovernor.com>; senator.grove@senate.ca.gov <senator.grove@senate.ca.gov>; assemblyca <assemblymember.tangipa@outreach.assembly.ca.gov>; David Tangipa <david@davidtangipaforassembly.com>; assemblymember.tangipa@assembly.ca.gov <assemblymember.tangipa@assembly.ca.gov>; David Tangipa <info@davidtangipa4ca.com>; ian.coolbear@asm.ca.gov <ian.coolbear@asm.ca.gov>; belle.castro@asm.ca.gov <belle.castro@asm.ca.gov>; emily.tymn@asm.ca.gov <emily.tymn@asm.ca.gov>

Sent: Sunday, May 3, 2026 at 03:36:53 PM PDT

Subject: Re: A THANKS FOR YOUR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF SOUND, SUSTAINABLE HSR IN CALIFORNIA

Joe,

Thanks for your note and the attachments. FWIW, I agree strongly with your argument that HSR ought to be OPERATED by the private sector if it is profitable or by the private sector competing for public support if it is not profitable. In the case of HSR in California, I do believe that revenues ought to be able to cover operating costs and maybe make a contribution to investment.

I do not believe that HSR in California (or anywhere) can be BUILT without a significant public role, nor should it as there are significant public benefits that the passenger (and the private operator) should not try to cover from revenues alone. ALL HSR that I am aware of has been built with public support, but at least some (Japan, France) operates at a surplus. Of course, the actual construction would be done by private contractors (under competition).

My concern all along has been the lack of clarity in California as to what are our objectives and how much are we willing to pay for them. This has, among other things, prevented us from developing the kind of stable, multi-year funding approach that the project needs. I have also been very concerned about the utter lack of real oversight of the way the project has been managed.

Again, thanks for your note.

Lou Thompson

On Sat, May 2, 2026 at 11:39 AM Joseph P Thompson <tranlaw@pacbell.net> wrote:

Mr. Lou S. Thompson
850 Webster St. #727
Palo Alto, CA 94301

cc: Mr. Tom Rubin; Mr. Steve Hilton

Dear Mr. Thompson,

Having just read your letter dated 3-27-26 to State government leadership, including our former SBC County Supervisor when we lived in Tres Pinos, I want to thank you for your insight and your well-thought out decision regarding the status and future of high speed rail in California.

Ever since I wrote to the Honorable Quentin Kopp in 1996 (see attached letter), it has been my position that, while desirable, high speed rail is only sustainable in the private sector.

The late honorable Norman Y. Mineta said in 1995 at the annual meeting of the Institute at SJSU that now bears his name, "The crucial question in transportation today is: What should government do, and what should it leave to others.?"

Dear Mr. [Name],

Thank you for your report. My question is:

Private or public? A perennial question facing the Nation. In his *"How We Built the*

Railway," Granville Dodge recounts his meeting with the President at the White House in 1864. To

his demand that the TC RR be government owned. Lincoln said no. it must be in the private sector, or words to that effect.

When enacting the Transportation Act of 1920, Congress effectively reversed the Wilson Administration's

nationalization of the railroads. Lady Thatcher basically did the same with British Rail.

In pre-Election debate with the Hon. Rod Diridon in 2008, I stressed the importance of a private

sector solution, at the debates sponsored by the joint Gilroy & Morgan Hill Chambers of Commerce

at the Gilroy Chamber's Conference Room. I repeated my position in letters to editors, and to the

HSRC and later then HSRA in response to requests for public comment. Also, I restated my position

in testimony before the Assembly Transportation Committee in 2010 in support of proposed legislation

by Diane Harkey to defund the Bullet Train. I have over the years continued to restate my position.

I recently spoke on Radio KMJ580 to Mr. Steve Hilton and Mr. Ray Appleton regarding my ideas for sound,

sustainable HSR in California. Mr. Hilton voiced his approval of my ideas.

So, therefore, I thank you for your insight into the issue of sound, sustainable HSR in California,

just as I have thanked Tom Rubin for his over these past years 2008-2026. In my opinion, we

ought to follow Lincoln's advice to Dodge, and the wisdom seen from Congress by enactment of

the Transportation Act of 1920. Warts and all, capitalism is better to build upon than the quicksand

of socialism. Sustainable rail is possible when built on the bedrock of capitalism.

Sincerely,

Joe Thompson

see bio attached
Fresno, CA 93711 in Mr. Tangipa's District; in Ms. Grove's District
(408) 607--7351 cell phone

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Lou Thompson
850 Webster Street Apt. 727
Palo Alto, CA 94301-2892
cell 202 413-5603

Sacramento Democrats Pass Bill to Shield High-Speed Rail Failures From The Public

sacramento-democrats-pass-bill-to-shield-high-speed-rail-failures-from-the-public

Joan Garth

May 5, 2026



and now estimates pushing toward \$231 billion for the full system. Even the scaled-back Merced-to-Bakersfield segment faces massive shortfalls, with funding gaps of \$10–14 billion or more and completion timelines slipping deep into the 2030s.

Assemblywoman Alexandra Macedo (R-Modesto) blasted the bill as a cover-up. "Sacramento Democrats just voted to cover up high-speed rail's failures," she stated, labeling AB 1608 a "political shield" for secret audits hidden from the public.

Sacramento Democrats just voted to cover up high-speed rail's failures. AB 1608 slams the door on transparency — secret audits, hidden from the public. Only Democrats will be allowed access. That's not oversight. That's a political shield. \$6,000,000,000 in overruns.... pic.twitter.com/7TPHc1dE24

— Assemblywoman Alexandra Macedo (@AsmwomanMacedo) May 4, 2026

State Sen. Tony Strickland (R-Huntington Beach), Vice Chair of the Senate Transportation Committee, has been a consistent voice against the fiscal disaster.

"The skyrocketing costs and lack of transparency surrounding this mismanaged high-speed rail project further erode the public's trust," Strickland said. "California does not have a revenue problem — we have a wasteful spending problem. This project stands out as one of the most significant examples of budgetary waste in the state. We are well beyond the original completion date of 2020, and the high-speed rail project today is not the same project that voters passed in 2008."

Today, Assembly Democrats passed Assembly Bill 1608, an anti-transparency measure that would allow the Inspector General of the California High-Speed Rail to shield contracts of \$1 million or more from standard state agency oversight, citing sensitive reports and potential... pic.twitter.com/GwyPwZAdrl

— Senator Tony Strickland (@SenStricklandCA) May 5, 2026

Strickland has repeatedly called for defunding the rail project and redirecting resources to priorities like gas tax relief, noting that billions have already been spent with little to show beyond scattered concrete viaducts, columns, and eminent domain battles that have threatened and confiscated Central Valley farmland.

California Globe has tracked the project's endless cost escalations for years: from early warnings of \$100 billion+ figures, to the 2025 reports of the "slush fund" climbing back toward \$130 billion, repeated funding gaps requiring billions more just for a partial segment, and the latest projections highlighting a project that has delivered virtually no operational service despite the massive taxpayer investment.

Supporters of AB 1608 claim the changes improve oversight while protecting sensitive data. Critics view it as the latest effort to insulate a chronically over-budget, behind-schedule failure from the very Californians paying the ever-rising bill — especially now that costs have ballooned dramatically and federal funding has largely vanished.

After the project swelled from \$33.5 billion to over \$130 billion (with higher estimates looming), Democrats now appear determined to hide the spending. Taxpayers are left wondering when — or if — Sacramento will finally hit the brakes on this runaway train.



Megan Barth is the Executive Editor of The California Globe and former, founding editor of the Nevada Globe. Specializing in investigative reporting, her work has appeared in national and local news. The highlights of her career include interviewing President Donald Trump, Vice President J.D. Vance, and FBI Director Kash Patel. When she isn't editing, writing, or talking, you can find her hiking and relaxing in Northern Nevada.

CA High-Speed Rail Cost Explodes to \$231 Billion, From Original \$33 Billion

CaliforniaGlobe.com | The print friendly version of this page is available at: <https://www.printfriendly.com/print?source=cs&url=https%3A%2F%2Fcaliforniaglobe.com%2F%2Fhigh-speed-rail-cost-explodes-to-231-billion-from-original-33-billion>

Katy Grimes

April 28, 2026

'Our country has never seen a fiscal disaster of this magnitude'

From: Joseph Patrick Thompson
Date: April 29, 2026 at 12:10 am
To: California Globe "CA High-Speed Rail Cost Explodes to \$231 Billion from Original \$33B"

Friends,

If the suggestion box is open. Put CAHSRA in Ch. 9. Do a liquidating plan of reorganization. Trade the partially completed infrastructure to the Class Ones in exchange for restoration of intermodal facilities in all ag-shipping Counties.

Auction off everything else.

Have the Trustee seek clawback of fraudulent transfers; he gets an extra two years on the Statute of Limitations courtesy of the Bankruptcy Code.

The additional TOFC & COFC revenue for the Class Ones offsets the losses moving passengers.

You'd have less traffic congestion on I-5 & Hwy. 99; fewer accidents, injuries & fatalities; cleaner air; less road surface and bridge support deterioration.

UP is seeking approval for its merger with NS: "the public interest" is a condition precedent to Surf-Board approval.

Public interest in the governing statute, 49 USC 11324(c) is not limited to the express conditions in the Section.

AB-377 (Tangipa) was no solution.

Rather than hang Stonehenge II around the necks of future generations, lets switch HSR to the private sector promised by Prop. 1A.

Joe Thompson
(408) 607-7351;
TransLaw@PacBell.Net

